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PREFACE 
This paper Is Intended as an Input into the policy review 
and evaluation currently underway within the Secretariat of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) of which the Caribbean Development and Co-operation 
Committee (CDCC) is a permanent subsidiary body. 
The purpose of this exercise is limited to providing a brief 
description and analysis of certain aspects of the Caribbean and 
its place in the wider international community. It has both a 
general and a specific objective. 
It is directed not to Caribbean people, for to them the 
facts will all be commonplace even if the analyses and opinions 
may not be shared, but rather to those less familiar wibh the 
historidaí'í cultural and economic interrelationships of the ^ 
diverse, yet similar small island states of the Caribbean. As a 
general objective it is directed therefore to those who have a 
'continental vision' of development, in the hope that it might 
provoke some reflection on the assumptions which will need to 
apply to small, (and some very small) island states as tliey 
struggle to Improve the lot of their peoples. The paper also 
has the more specific objective of reviewing the genesis and 
rationale for the CDCC from which it draws its definition of 
Caribbean, seeking to place it within the context of current and 
future regional developmental initiatives. 
The author has benefited from the resources of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) including 
the comments of various staff members in the Caribbean Subregional 
Headquarters which have assisted him to complete this paper. Any 
errors, interpretations or opinions are however solely his respons-
ibility. 
THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION COmiTTEE 
- ITS GENESIS AND EVOLUTION 
The creation of the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee 
(CDCC) In November 1975 was a significant step in the evolution of 
Caribbean institutions. For not only did it initiate the process of 
dialogue and interaction between the countries of the wider Caribbean, 
but it provided an opportunity for them jointly to advance their 
relations with Latin America and, at the operational level, with the 
United Nations System. 
As' i^te entrants into the United Nations the English-speaking 
countries of the Caribbean found themselves a part of the regional 
system dominated by Latin American constitutional and political modes 
and perceptions with which they felt uncomfortable. Moreover, the 
developmental preoccupations of Latin America were not perceived to be 
identical to those of the small Islands of the Caribbean-
Initial proposals by governments to the UN Secretary-General aimed 
at establishing an Economic Commission for the Caribbean were curtailed, 
following the creation of a Caribbean Office of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and, the Caribbean (ECLAC) located in Trinidad and Tobago 
to cover Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, Curagao, Aruba 
and the then British Leeward and Windward Islands. The Office became 
fully operational on 1 December 1966. Its main objective was to collect 
Iriídtitiáfeioh dbdüt these territories in order to better understand the 
áijécíái cHáfaclterlstics and problems of small Island states in the 
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Caribbean and so better represent their interests in the activities 
of the Economic Commission. The work programme of the Caribbean 
Office remained, however, essentially an extension of that determined 
for Latin America although with the focus in Latin America being 
oriented towards integration there was a great deal of scope to 
engage in activities that were currently of relevance to Commonwealth 
Caribbean countries since they were endeavouring at this time to find 
mechanisms for co-operation following the demise of the West Indies 
Federation. It therefore gave active assistance in the negotiations 
leading to the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(CARIFTA^if^as well as to the establishment of the Caribbean Development , 
Bank (CDB). Other activities included much of the preparatory tasks 
for the implementation of the Agricultural Marketing Protocol, 
facilitating the creation within the CARJFTA of the East Caribbean 
Common Market (ECCM) made up of the then West Indies Associated States, 
the establishment of the Caribbean Investment Corporation (CIC), and 
preparatory work facilitating the further deepening of the trade 
integration process. Accordingly, the Office worked closely with the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat on matters connected with 
the signing of the Treaty at Chaguaramas, bringing the Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM), into being. Once these tasks 
were complete the Caribbean Office began to look towards fulfilling 
other longer term needs for co-operation in the wider Caribbean region. 
In may 1975 the Sixteenth Session of ECLA was held in Port-of-Spain, 
íifihldád ánd Tobago. 
The then Prime Minister of the host country 
bri Éiric Williams, recognizing that the Caribbean Office of ECLA needed 
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to increase the scope of its jurisdiction to more completely reflect 
the common interests and preoccupations of the Caribbean, and fearing 
that if the Caribbean did not further consolidate its efforts, it would 
run the risk of losing its identity proposed "the establishment of a 
Caribbean Council (sic) of ECLA to deal specifically with Caribbean 
issues and circumstances and to embrace all Caribbean entities from 
Belize to Cayenne, irrespective of political status". Based on this 
proposal Resolution 358(XVI) establishing the Caribbean Development and 
Co-operation Committee (CDCC) was prepared and co-sponsored by Cuba 
which also shared some of the concerns of Trinidad and Tobago. The 
Resolution which was adopted on 13 liay 1975 defined the membership 
of the CDCC as those countries fully "within the sphere of action of 
the ECLA Office in Port-of-Spain and the Governments of Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti and other Caribbean countries as they 
achieve independence". By the terms of the resolution the Committee 
would "act as a co-ordinating body for activities relating to development 
and co-operation". The Executive-Secretary of ECLA was accordingly 
asked "to co-operate with the governments concerned on matters within 
his competence on matters which are of concern to these countries, 
" and " t9 undertake studies and 
promote initiatives 
designed to strengthen the co-operation of the other member countries 
of ECLA and integration groupings of the Latin American region with 
the Committee ..." 
The first meeting of the CDCC was held in Cuba from 31 October-
4 ílbVfetiíbéf Í975í It was attended by the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, 
fiáfbádoa, duba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica 
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and Trinidad and Tobago as full members. Belize and the West Indies 
Associated States attended as Associate Members. At the meeting 
note was also taken of the fact that Suriname was due to achieve 
independence in November 1975 and would be entitled to full membership 
on admission to the United Nations. An Observer from the Netherlands 
Antilles was also invited to attend the first session. Resolution 1(1) 
of the CDCC subsequently invited the Associate Members and Observers 
present to attend all future meetings of the Committee. 
In the Constituent Declaration of the CDCC the Ministers 
"Recognizing that the Caribbean countries share a geographic, cultural 
and hi^oric proximity that must be taken into account when establishing 
the forms and mechanisms for co-operation among them, and that they 
have also inherited similar economic structures and have similarities 
in the majority of social and economic.problems they face" declared their 
political will to "carry out a policy for the optimum utilization of the 
available resources of the subregion, thus promoting its economic and 
social development and advancing progressively towards better co-ordination 
of their countries economies in the future". They stated further that 
"Based 
on recognition of the advantages of economic complementation, 
this policy will give impetus to co-operation among member countries, 
particularly in the implementation of joint projects, the exchange of 
experience and mutual aid, and through mechanisms - including trade - • 
which will contribute to this end". 
For a better understanding of the Institution that was being 
efédtéd it is useful to Isolate a few of the important threads that 
feeiré béilli Wüveti into its backdrop, such as the OPEC oil price increase; 
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the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; the Seventh 
Special Session of the United Nations; and the creation of SELA. 
These events manifested a confidence on the part of the developing 
countries in the mechanism of South-South Co-operation and the use 
of the solidarity deriving therefrom for North-South negotiations. 
At the same time, these events were perceived by the countries of 
the North with unease and policies of containment were being developed 
to counteract what was seen by some as the emerging "trade union of 
the poor". 
In the Caribbean itself there were, on the one hand, moves to 
devel95g,.linkages with the newly rich and influential oil powerfe, 
particularly Mexico and Venezuela, and on the other, fears that the 
region was in danger of being dominated by powers either to the North 
or to the South of it. At the same time the language of the Declaration 
lead some existing institutions to fear that their role would be usurped 
or diminished by the new one. This is particularly true as ECLA has 
as its central theme the regional integration of Latin America, which 
is usually presumed to include the Caribbean. Moreover, the strategy 
subsequently adopted was to foster subregional integration movements 
with the ultimate objective of linking them. The CDCC was therefore 
perceivcd by some as a mechanism for integrating all Lhe Caribbean 
prior to its incorporation into Latin America but by others as a means 
of harnessing the unique Caribbean experience for functional co-operation 
precisely to guard against its Incorporat 
ion into Latin America. It should 
also be noted that the idea of integration was not universally supported 
even by the members of CARICOM. 
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The scope of the CDCC work programme was fixed at the first 
meeting. At that stage the perception of the CDCC was one of 
promoting greater co-operation between the member countries themselves 
and of ensuring a better co-ordination of the inputs of techical 
assistance from all its various sources. The CDCC assisted by the 
Secretariat was therefore being empowered to carry out two basic tasks. 
It was mandated to co-ordinate the inputs of the various technical 
asistance agencies within a conceptual framework to be defined by the 
ministerial sessions. It was also expected to foster co-operation 
between the Members, Associate Members and Observers of the Committee. 
The Secretariat was expected to provide the necessary substantive inputs 
• -^Jf-S 
whenever necessary. The debate on the work programme therefore centered 
around making the areas of co-operation and co-ordination as complete 
and all embracing as possible. At that stage no project-oriented work 
programmewas envisaged. 
Subsequently, emphasis tended to shift from the task of co-ordination, 
the success or failure which was often difficult to measure, and which also 
ran into difficulty with the specialized institutions having separate 
and sometimes conflicting mandates with the CDCC, to focus on co-operation 
as a yardstick by which to judge CDCC performance. The mechanism by 
which co-ordination of the 
outputs of the Û3 system-was to take place, 
the interagency meeting which was scheduled to be held after each CDCC 
meeting was convened twice, but did not have the Intended effect, 
partly because of the difficulty experienced by individual governments 
in maintaining consistent policies from one forum to another. This was 
due to a lack of effective internal co-ordination on foreign economic 
policy issues as advanced by the Departments of Finance, Planning, Trade 
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and Foreign Affairs but also In lesser degree between the departments 
responsible for social matters such as Health, Education and Culture. 
In sum the co-ordination of external developmental agencies was not 
effective through the CDCC because a necessary pre-condition - the 
co-ordination of national government policy internally, which should 
have taken place between the various ministries operating in the 
international arena - was not itself satisfied. Inconsistencies created 
confusion and conflicting mandates, and agencies tended to revert 
naturally to instructions emanating from their own intergovernmental 
forums. 
Secondly, the secretariat was not able to assist the governments 
in the task of co-ordinating technical assistance inputs since the 
post of co-ordinator remained unfilled for long periods of time and 
even when an encumbent was in place he was seldom able to maintain the 
necessary degree of dialogue with the governments on the one hand, and 
with the agencies on the other. But in any case this task would not 
have been possible without determined and consistent government support 
in all the relevant forums. While some attempt is made through the 
Caribbean Group for Co-operation in Economic Development the CGCED, to 
co-ordinate donor country Inputs at the national level the task of 
4 
co-ordinating the regional inputs from the i 
nternational agenciea remains 
unfulfilled. The CDCC still provides the only forum for this task 
because of its universal membership and multidisciplinary nature, but 
its potential will not be realized until enough CDCC governments are 
able to co-ordinate and systematize their own foreign policy. 
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In the absence of co-ordination, focus was therefore placed on 
co-operation. But while South-South co-operation was regarded as a 
necessary part of the process of development by a few people it was 
regarded by many more as a tactic to strengthen the negotiating capacity 
of the South in the North-South dialogue and a shift in emphasis in 
this direction was to be seen over time. The shift was caused by a 
number of factors. It became clear that the OPEC cartel was not 
easily repeatable. It also became clear that the developing countries, 
particularly the middle Income oil importing developing countries, were 
being hardest hit by OPEC, which in turn was not using its resources 
for effective South-South co-operation since the petro dollars were 
being recycled in the form of short term - high interest loans. As the 
industrial countries experienced recession, countries of the South 
focused attention on their sources of hard currency earnings in the 
North and became preoccupied at the same time with domestic policies. 
The focus therefore shifted to domestic preoccupations and to the 
negotiations with the North. TCDC and ECDC were therefore relegated 
in order of importance on the international agenda as the short term 
took precedence over the medium and long term. In this scenario the 
international agencies were soon to be jud^d by the speed with which 
they were able to tî ansfer resources, either material or technical. 
The focus by governments on more operational project type activities 
growing out of the CDCC work programme placed it at variance with the 
activities defined by the Economic Commission as a whole. As a result 
the Secretariat had to face two sets of mandates, one for which it had to 
be answerable in person to ministers on an annual basis. The scope of 
thfe wotk programme, defined in the first place for the task of co-ordination, 
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assumed more daunting proportions once it needed to be operationalized, 
and implemented by a small staff with severely limited resources. 
The quest of the CDCC In the last five years has been one of 
trying to ensure its relevance in the face of the changing needs and 
demands of its members. Its secretariat has in turn had to try to 
secure some freedom from its headquarters in the sphere of policy, in 
order to make its work programme harmonize with these changing demands 
and perceptions, while at the same time struggling to obtain the 
resources needed to fulfil the greater demands made upon it. 
After 18 years the two distinct but interrelated objectives of 
the, §ijJxregional Headquarters of ECLAC in Port-of-Spain remained; to 
ensure a Caribbean input into the United Nations on the one hand, and 
to create a functionally relevant programme for itself on the other. 
These objectives reflect the quest of Caribbean governments for a 
UN Institution with a Caribbean identity and relevance which caused 
the Caribbean Office of ECLA to be established in 1966, and which 
subsequently motivated the establishment of the CDCC nine years later. 
It is noteworthy that this quest remains as urgent as ever and derives 
from the different and conflicting bases upon which the Office was 
founded; as an agency for preserving the Caribbean consciousness and 
integrity, on the one hand; and, as an agency for introducing the 
Caribbean into Latin America, on the other. The difficulty in arriving 
at a common set of activities reflects the different perceptions as 
to the potential and orientation of Caribbean development, as seen from 
the Caribbean perspective on the one hand, and from Latin America with 
its 'continental vision' on the other. 
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THE CARIBBEAN - ITS STRUCTURAL REALITY 
Any discussion of the Caribbean Immediately prompts the question: 
"which Caribbean?". For since the 15th century the region has been 
the victim of intense colonial rivalries between the Dutch, English, 
French and Spanish and has witnessed the introduction of European, 
African and Asian peoples and their cultures to be superimposed on 
the indigenous Amerindian peoples. The resulting politico-cultural 
ferment has fragmented the region in such a way that the quest for a 
sense of community may be predicated on any number of premises. 
In this discussion we define Caribbean as those participants in 
the Cifibbean Development and Co-operation Committee, for the most 
part island territories with the exception of three countries, Belize, 
Guyana and Suriname which nevertheless manifest many of the characteristics 
of 'islands in Latin America looking toward the Caribbean'. While the 
foregoing Is a political/institutional definition the area of 
delimitation manifests sufficient socio cultural similarities to lead 
Charles Wagley^nd others to typifying it as 'Plantation America' as 
distinct from Euro-America or Indo-America. These aspects will be 
developed later. 
I 
It is clear t^at despite the cultural similarities the CDCC is 
not a homogeneous group jand for the purpose of political analysis varying 
degrees of community can be discerned within that grouping. A typology 
of concentric circles is perhaps a useful way of perceiving the varying 
degtteés df interllnkages which exist among its members. 
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The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) would be 
placed in the innermost concentric circle. It comprises eight very 
small English-speaking countries in a treaty arrangement embracing 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, and Economic Affairs and was 
established in June 1981. The member countries are Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Christopher/Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and the British Virgin Islands. 
Antecedents to the OECS include previous attempts at federation in the 
mid-1960s when the "little eight" was envisaged to include Barbados 
(with which a special relationship remains in the area of collective 
securi^^. Subsequently, the West Indies Associated States (WISA) 
was found and the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) came into being 
in July 1968. The latter now continues under the aegis of the OECS 
which has also absorbed other functional agencies Into the grouping 
such 
as thfi EBSC CaribbGan CGntral Bank (ECCB), ttiG East CaribbGan 
Tourist Association (ECTA) and the Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority (CCAA), 
The supreme organ of the OECS is the meeting of heads of government 
with a central secretariat empowered to implement the mandates of 
governments. The most populous member has a population of 120,000, the 
largest in area being 290 square miles. The grouping as a lihole includes 
550,000 people and approximately 971 square miles of territory scattered 
over many islands and cays. In 1980 the average GDP/Capita for the OECS 
was $640. 
All member states have constitutions based on the Westminster 
E'áfliatiiéntafy Model with freely formed political parties competing for 
effitié at regular Intervals, on a basis of universal adult sufferage. 
I 
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There has traditionally been a high degree of mobility of people and 
goods between the Islands of the OECS, and with this has grown ties 
of economic interdependence, familiarity and kinship. 
Because of their very small size and the fact that many of them 
are multi-island states there is universal concern about the vulnerability 
of their territorial Integrity primarily through secession and to 
external forces including mercenaries. Of perhaps more immediate 
concern, however, is the threat to the integrity of their marine space. 
The intention to develop close security relationships and joint 
diplomatic representation is not therefore so very difficult to understand 
when seen in this light and has a better chance of success than similar 
initiatives which were attempted at the wider grouping of CARICOM. One 
of the major 
purposes and functions of the OECS is to "promote unity and 
solidarity among the member states and to defend their sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and independence". 
In so far as the provisions of the ECCM are concerned the format 
and conditions relating to the movement of goods within the ECCM are 
similar to those which apply within CARICOM, (of v;hich the ECCM countries 
are also a part). In so far as the movement of persons, services and 
capital are concerned the ECCM makes provision at the outset for much « 
greater factor mobility although in the administration of these 
provisions this potential has not been realized. 
The second concentric circle would encompass the previously 
mRntioned OECS but also include Barbados, Belize, the Commonwealth of 
<ie Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, a constellation 
comprising the CARICOM. This grouping encompasses a population of about I 
I i 
- 13 -
5.5 million people with an average per capita GDP of approximately 
$1,600 in 1980. There is however, some variation in wealth between 
members with Trinidad and Tobago having a per capita GDP of $3,324 
in that year and Saint Vincent having about $368. As a result of 
these disparities provision is made in CARICOM for special treatment 
to be accorded to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which include 
the OECS countries and Belize. 
The three basic objectives of CARICOM are: 
a) Economic Integration (through the 
Caribbean Common Market; 
b) Functional Co-operation; and 
V 
c'f" Co-ordination of Foreign Policies. 
The degree of inteplinkage in CARICOM is not as great as that 
envisaged in the OECS. These limited expectations are conditioned 
by memories of the failure of the Caribbean Federation which focused 
on a political structure at a time in which island nationalism was 
on the increase. But even the economic focus is limited. A careful 
reading of the treaty shows that CARICOM is not a common market in the 
pure sense since there is no free movement of factors, neither of 
capital, of labour!nor of products. 
The proportion»of interregional trade to total trade was nearly 
9 percent in 1982 but major elements of the plan to increase trade 
such as the Agricultural Marketing Protocol (AMP) have not met with 
I 
the success envisaged.. The Common External Tariff (GET) while not 
yét ádtipfeéd by all is of limited consequence even when applied, since 
fché tiátiohál gdvernments tan unilaterally set tariffs on most raw materials. 
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intermedlate goods and capital goods. But the greatest single constraint 
to trade is the balance-of-payments situation of some members, and 
because of this CARICOM trade had ceased to grow since 1975. The CARICOM 
Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF) which was established in 1979, was 
suspended in 1983 as it ran short of liquidity. 
Despite great efforts by the CARICOM Secretariat policies to 
progranmie industrial activity based on efficiency criteria have not 
generally been accepted by governments. 
The record in the field of functional co-operation is better and 
extends to health, education, the University of the West Indies and I 
the Caribbean Examination Council (CXC), technical assistance substantially 
through the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), information, through the 
Caribbean News Agency (CANA), and culture through the biannual Caribbean 
Festival of Arts (CARIFESTA). 
The co-ordination of foreign policy is a relatively late starter 
in CARICOM and has had some success, despite strong nationalism, 
because there exists a solid concensus on a number of fundamental 
issues such as Apartheid, the Law of the Sea, the territorial claims 
on Guyana and Belize, ACP/EEC negotiations. Moreover, in the multilateral 
forums Caribbean perceptions are almost identical. 
Wha tEver the di£ficultires experienced in the establishment of 
I ' 
CARICOM there is a áense of cotnraunity which derives from common historic, 
ethnic, cultural and constitutional roots and provides the basis for its 
solidatity^ Indeed the Treaty of Chaguaramas begins with an expression 
of défeérihinátidri by heads of government "to consolidate and strengthen 
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I 
the bonds which has historically existed among their people". It may 
be that the potential for; achieving this goal In the economic realm 
is limited, but these basic sentiments are strong and enduring although 
they may have to find a full flowering in other areas. 
The CDCC would form the third concentric circle and to the CARICOM 
countries would be added Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, the 
Netherlands Antilles, Suriname and the British and U.S. Virgin Islands. 
It incorporates 20 countries with a population of approximately 28 
I 
million people covering aj cumulated land mass of approximately 630,000 
sq.km. or a population similar in size to Colombia in a land area 
somewhaf̂ ĵjess than Chile.! In this grouping the level of heterogeneity 
increases further with the Inclusion of new cultural linguistic 
constitutional elements deriving from the fact that while CARICOM states 
were ex-British colonies the CDCC incorporates the former colonies of 
the Spanish, French and Dutch empires. But while the competition 
between these empires lead to political and cultural fragmentation 
there were common unifying themes and similar experiences which form 
! 
the basis for a belief in. the existence of a Caribbean society and 
culture. I ' 'I ' ' 
Charles Wagley has labelled this area 'Plantation America' which 
he distinguishes from Euro-America or Indo-America. Its common features 
include mono-crop cultivation under the plantation system, rigid class 
lines, multi-racial societies, weak community cohesion, small peasant i I 'I 
groups pioducing for subsistence. ! Culturally there are sirailarlties 
iri all the states in production techniques, marketing arrangements, 
eiil&itlé» müslc and dance.J; folklore^ religious cults, traditions, values 
áha belisfi. Other common experiences derive from the institutions 
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of slavery, the struggle for land of the newly freed slaves and the 
chronic distrust of authojrity which survives until the present. 
Subsequently, all entered,into a process of rejection of colonial 
rule, suffered the legacies of racial admixture in complex race 
patterns, and currently face the future with common problems, economic 
as well as social. They currently produce many of the same products 
in the same ways and compete internationally for the same markets. 
In the eighties they face^ the same problems of adjustment to the 
changing external environment which impacts upon them in the same ways. 
Therefore, as the process of decolonization plays Itself out there is 
the temptation to look inward within the Caribbean to one's neighbours 
for undepatanding, to seek solutions to common problems, and for a sense 
# 
of identity. In this regard it is noteworthy that Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and Suriname have sought a greater level of participation in 
CARICOM and the newly emerging Netherlands Antilles looks to the Caribbean 
for a possible future orientation. 
The fourth concentric circle would extend to the countries on 
the periphery of the Carl|>bean Basin, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela and while these ] 
countries are not the forms of this paper linkages with CDCC countries 
are of some Importance and derive mainly from the economic influence 
of Mexico, Venezuela and 
I I 
Trinidad I and Tobago. CDC 
developed linkages with t 
Colombia and also to Venezuela, in the case of 
I states with an Iberian heritage will also have 
lese basin states. 
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The foregoing discussion, while useful to illustrate the varying 
levels of linkages existing between groups of states in the region 
also has implications for the prograinine of activities of the CDCC 
itself, since it is clear that activities requiring a high level of 
concensus for their acceptance will have a better chance of being 
adopted by the OECS than the CDCC as a whole. 
The typology also needs to be modified in some ways to take into 
account various other elements such as creóle English/French and 
English/Spanish groups which exist in some CARICOM states and provide 
additional linkages to the non-English speaking areas. 
The focus of this discussion will be placed on the 20 participants 
in the CDCC although it will need to be borne in mind that in the 
fullness of time potential exists for at least five new entrants to 
this institution. 
Aside from the question of size the most significant factor 
common to CDCC countries as a whole, is the level of openness of these 
societies. For reasons of size, resource endowments and history, 
Caribbean economies are open. They are highly dependent upon trade 
I and therefore susceptible to the vagaries of the international economic 
I 
environment. As a result they have, given their limited means, 
I 
developed a relatively sophisticated set of linkages and arrangements 
with the outside woijld and the attitudes developed through these 
contacts permeate areas other than the purely economic. 
p. 
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The Caribbean and Its External Relations 
The use of the concept of concentric circles while useful to 
describe linkages within the Caribbean does not find as easy accommo-
dation when used to describe its external relations. For these are 
governed by a network of political, social and economic factors as 
they have evolved through time. Since the history of the region is 
Intimately related to the colonial wars of the British, Spanish, 
French and Dutch it is not therefore surprising to find that signi-
ficant linkages deriving from the past remain with Europe, through 
economic arrangements, political constitutional forms, and also In 
social relations, as significant Caribbean communities have developed 
in these countries. But in the twentieth century the focus of the 
Caribbean has slowly shifted, so that by the 1980s, relations with 
North America constitute the chief preoccupation of all the states in 
the subregion. 
While all the countries being discussed were colonies, and in some 
cases were the possessions of successive European empires as determined 
by the vicissitudes of war, the nature and the duration of colonialism 
differed, as did the means by which they gained independence. Thus 
4 
Haiti seized Its independence from the French as early as 1804; the 
Dominican Republic, after a period of Haitian control, in 184A; and 
Cuba, in 1898. The English, French and Dutch islands remained under 
colonial control Until the 1960s when the process of British decoloniza-
tibri iíegán. Nfeiréftheless, a colonial presence remains, since the French, 
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British and Dutch still retain territories in the region. But since 
the United States regarded the Caribbean as strategically important 
Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic came under the control of 
that country in the early twentieth century and as British influence 
has waned the interest of the United States has increased to fill 
the gap in her former colonies. 
The 'plantation' arrangements whereby the colonies produced 
tropical agricultural products for the European metropoles had also 
somewhat different effects from one island to another. In the case 
of Haiti it was terminated at a relatively early stage and after 
severing^lier political links with France transferred her productive 
apparatus essentially for domestic consumption. Many of the pressures 
of the international economy were subsequently not felt and internal 
economic development proceeded on a different path. 
In the Spanish colonies where the 'plantation' system was first 
developed Spanish preoccupation soon shifted to the mainland, relegating I 
I ) 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico to the role of providing 
waystations for the transit of minerals to Spain. The subsequent 
re-emergence of the plantation did not co-exist for long enough with 
Spanish jurisdiction to allow any significant economic integration with • I « ,) ' I 
Spain so the full ,flowering of the plantaLion in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
in the 1930s came about d 
Links therefore developed 
ue to American Investment and technology, 
with the United States of America and by the 
end|Of the nineteenth century United States investment In the Cuban 
I 
§Ugdt iiidüétiry álrfeady exceeded thirty million dollars some of the 
iáirfeéSfe áhd ihtísfe üp-td-'dáte plantations being owned by the United I 
afeafe®».!̂  iy tha 19508 Uplted States investment in Cuba was estimated 
-20-
4/ to be $666 million.— 
It is in the British, French and Dutch territories however that 
the vertical linkages with the respective empires became strongest 
so that one witnessed a situation where crude materials were imported 
from the West Indies to Europe for processing and subsequently re-exported 
to the same territories as finished products. This process of integration 
into the European economies continued to the present in the case of 
French and Dutch islands, and did so in the British islands up until the 
Second World War when as a result of a combination of circumstances 
including depressed living conditions, developing island nationalism, 
and the'dSfleted power of Great Britain, the process of decoloniza^tion 
began to play itself out. 
The history of the Caribbean is also characterised by massive 
movements of people and these movements have had a significant Impact 
on Caribbean external relations. Initially migration was characterised 
by an inward flow of European colonists, then a vast trafficking in 
slaves to serve the developing plantation system, and following the 
abolishion of the slave trade, indentured labour from Asia. In the i 
twentieth century the inward flow of Immigrants to the Caribbean declined 
to be replaced by an internal movement of people as the plantation 
system declined in the older colonies and grew in Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic. As a result, one witnessed an inflow of 217,000 workers to 
Cuba from Haiti, Jamaica and Puerto Rico from 1913-1924. In 1920 alone 
4/ 
63,000 workers moved from Haiti and Jamaica to Cuba.— The growing 
stigat piahtations of the Dominican Republic also depended on migrant 
lábtíUlTi tódihly from tíalti but also from Jamaica and other British 
ee«»£(!c>t>iee. Many of these workers remained. Between 1905 and 1913 a 
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constant work force of 35,000 was needed to construct the Panama Canal, 
workers recruited mainly from Jamaica and Barbados throughout the 
period.—^ Many of them remained on the mainland moving along the North 
East Co3st of Central America to form English-speaking enclaves in 
Central America, or eventually drifting onwards to the United States. 
I 
After World War II the patterns of migration changed, so that large 
waves of unemployed British West Indian v/orkers emigrated to the United 
Kingdom. It is estimated that in the period 1951-1961 about 280,000 
people from the British Caribbean moved to that country.—'' Even after 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was passed in 1962 the flow continued 
though somewhat abated as early migrants transferred their families and 
kin. Similar patterns were to be noted In the Netherlands. By 1975 
it was estimated that 135,000 Surinamese lived in the Netherlands,—'' 
about 37 percent of the Surinamese population at that time. 
As a result of changing migration policies after 1965, the major 
destination for British West Indian migrants switched to North America, 
' ! 
the United States, andlCanada. It is estimated that between 1950 and 
' I I' 
1972 100,000 British Westjindians migrated to Canada, and 200,000 entered 
the United States legally. In addition to the estimated 150,000 who did 
ipre is! also the phenomenon of the seasonal farm worker 
Lit 12,000 of which migrated in 1981, a typical year, 
9/ 
Q / 
SO illegdlly.- Th 
to be considered abo 
for seasonal farm work.—' 
I I 
Between 1970 aî d the 
sustained with the modifi 
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present the tempo of migration has been 
:ation that most migrants are now skilled 
workers. In 1978 44 percent of the total number of migrants to 
Canada and the United States from Jamaica fell into the category 
of white-collar workers.-
British Caribbean, migrations from Haiti and Cuba are even more 
dramatic,and widely publi 
Caribbean peoples are to 
1960-1978 approximately 9 
3 / While figures were quoted for the 
:ized, and sizeable communities of these 
je found in North America. For the period 
30,000 Caribbean migrants entered the 
11/ United States, 18 percentjof all its migrants. 
Cuban migration patterns manifest somewhat different paths, • -j-.jf-y 
primarily for political r 
of a major portion of the 
closed, is well documente 
migrate which developed s 
April-September 1980 over 
before the Port of Mariel 
I 
masons. Between 1958 and 1973, the departure 
skilled workforce until legal channels were 
i. Some Indication of the pressures to 
ibsequently can be seen by the fact that from 
125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States 
was closed, and Cuban authorities estimated 
12/ that a further 375,000 woiild subsequently seek authority to leave.-
In Haiti post-war migration took a major leap with the departure 
of many of the middle cla 
to improve their economic 
ips intellectuals and professionals wishing 
prospects as well as to escape the social and 
political pressures of the Duvalier regime. It is estimated that 
75 percent of the professional and skilled technical personnel may 
I 
have left Haiti since 195p for Canada, France, and the United 
13/ States.- Subsequent attempts by the unskilled boat people to 
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mlgrate to the Bahamas and the United States are also well documented 
though an estimate of the numbers Involved Is vague. It Is however 
estimated that about 450,000 Haitians currently live in the United 
States.— 
In summary the rate of migration of all Caribbean people to the 
United States in recent years is high. 
It is estimated that about 15 percent of the total Caribbean 
population lives in the United States-"^ and this figure would be 
significantly higher for North America as a whole since it is estimated 
that from 1971-1979 about 107,000 persons migrated from the Caribbean 
to Canada. Moreover these trends are expected to continue despite 
' ••^..jf-.r m 
tightening immigration policies in the recipient"countries. 
Migration has been discussed in some detail because it is a 
significant factor in Caribbean external relations, both officially 
and at the grassroots of the society, and since it has significant 
social^ political^ economicj and cultural Impacts in the region. The 
impact is Increased since in most countries migration is not regarded 
as a permanent exile but rather a temporary expedient to improve the life 
style in line with North American or European patterns. In fact for some 
Caribbean people migration is seen as a means of extending the frontier 
i 
of their economic space, a frontier in which they continue to move freely. 
So, remittances from nationals abroad represent a significant source of 
foreign exchange earnings for most Caribbean societies, and many migrants 
have enterprises operating simultaneously in North America and the 
Caribbeafl. Many of them return to the Caribbean as pensioners and therefore 
make proVi&iott for their retirement throughout their working lives. 
Interaction between Caribbean persons in the metropolitan countries and 
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those in the Caribbean is therefore continuous and intense and the 
perceptions of those receiving remittances from abroad are sharpened 
as to the benefits of earning hard currency. 
In terms of political and economic influence some links still 
remain with Europe. The socialist international still retains links 
with kindred social democratic parties in the Caribbean and helps to 
shape and sustain the values of this group. European investment in the 
Caribbean remains sizeable. The French and Dutch military presence 
is focused mainly in Guadeloupe and Curasao respectively, and a 
significant United Kingdom military base is located in Belize. But the 
real power of the United Kingdom in the Caribbean began to wane with 
the decline of the British Empire after World War II, and is more or less 
absent now that most former British territories have become independent. 
Institutional links based on this colonial heritage still remain, however, 
in the form of Commonwealth relationships and an attachment to certain 
inherited constitutional norms. The linkages with the migrant community 
in the United Kingdom still remain although this is weakening. 
An echo of historical economic linkages with Europe remains in the 
Lomé agreements which the Caribbean islands have with the EEC and which 
makes provision for inter alia preferential access to EEC markets, 
financial and technical co-operation and a scheme to compensate Caribbean 
countries for fluctuations in the earnings of their exports, mainly sugar 
and bananas, to the EEC (STABEX). 
It is the ascendancy of the United States, however, in both political 
and efcdridflllc terms that leaves the most lasting impression. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the prevailing belief in the 
United Státes was that it was destined to dominate the Hemisphere. The 
argument for Caribbean control was sometimes rationalised to the Europeans 
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by stating that the Caribbean was anagous to the 'American Mediterranean'. 
It was therefore United States policy to remove the European powers, 
beginning with Spain, from the Caribbean. 
By 1898 Spanish political power in the Caribbean was at an end, 
Puerto Rico passed to the Unitéd States and Cuba gained its independence, 
though under the surveillance of the United States. Subsequent United 
States interventions in Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were 
made on the rationale that she needed to ensure good government in the 
area i.e. of being the regional policeman. 
In economic terms the dominant force in the Caribbean in the 
twentieth century was also the United States. As the older sugar 
producers declined it was Cuba and the Dominican Republic with United 
States investment and technology that took the lead in sugar production. 
And as production shifted to bananas it was the newly emerging United 
States multinationals that dominated. United States dominance was complete 
by the time it moved into the field of minerals. Political and economic 
interests became inextricably linked. 
In outlining some of the more significant points in Caribbean 
political economic and social relations with the metropoles one notices 
a shift in emphases from Europe to North America. This assertion needs 
however to be qualified for the case of Cuba. Since Fidel Castro came 
to power, one of his objectives has been to try to reduce United States 
influence in Cuban policy. In an attempt to do so however it was found 
necessary to become a member of the CMEA in 1971, and to integrate the 
Cuban economy into the common market of the Eastern European Socialist 
Bloc. Moreover such policy has had the effect of creating a sizeable 
Cuban community in Miami which still has strong links with their kin 
in Cuba. It would probably not be an overstatement to say that Cubans 
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and Americans are just as preoccupied with each other as at any time 
in this century. 
The United States for its part is becoming increasingly preoccupied 
with the wider Caribbean which is still regarded by some as its 
mediterranean. In the last 20 years developments in Cuba have made it 
increasingly concerned that no other territories fall into hands that 
the United States might regard as hostile. This concern is due in part 
to a changing perception about its 'southern flank' i.e. the Caribbean 
and Latin America, the security of which is assumed to be fundamental 
to United States strategic thinking since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, but which has been challenged recently. This security is 
important to the United States since 50 percent of all its foreign trade . 
tonnage and crude oil imports pass through Caribbean sea lanes. The 
Caribbean Basin is also assumed to constitute a significant reservoir 
of strategic raw materials for the United States. Finally, the 
agglomeration of small islands and cays in the Caribbean, complicates 
the task of safeguarding these sea lanes, especially if in unfriendly 
hands and also of protecting the Panama Canal which is itself of crucial 
strategic importance to the United States since it provides the only 
sea link between its east and west coasts. 
The uncontrolled" flow of people from the Caribbean is also of concern 
to the United States. This flow tends to increase in countries tíhere 
political or economic instability exists. The Caribbean is said to 
constitute the second largest source of illegal immigrants, after Mexico. 
Because of its size and the assumption that it could be taken for 
grahtScl there has tended not to be a co-ordinated and consistent policy 
tdííráfdi fehe dárlbbean. Perhaps this policy is about to change. The 
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Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBI) while significantly weakened 
as it passed through the legislative process, was an attempt by the 
United States to provide an integrated package of trade, investment and 
financial measures for Caribbean countries. It went further however in 
requiring that certain conditions be met by the recipient countries. 
These conditions relate to such diverse fields as their political 
affiliation, their treatment of United States investments, drug control, 
copjrwrite, financial information, extradition, trade policies and 
trades union policy, all areas in which the United States has in the 
past tried, in a haphazard way, to exert control. The provisions of 
the Act apply to all CDCC countries who wish to participate and who meet 
% • -.rjf.r 
the criteria, except Cuba. 
The CBI had originally been Intended to include other 'donor" 
countries besides the United States of America. In the initial discuséions 
Canada, Mexico and Venezuela had also béen asked to participate and had 
in fact done so but have not participated subsequently. In this sense 
the CBI might have been expected to take the concept of the Caribbean 
Group for Co-operation in Development (CGCED) a stage further. 
The CGCED, which is administered by the World Bank (IBRD) arid meets 
in Washington is essentially a forum whereby donors and recipients meet 
to discuss technical»and financial assistance needs, and is an attempt 
to rationalise the overlapping assistance programmes which had evolved 
from the previous colonial development programmes. Aside from the 
traditional bilateral donors the participation of other agencies, active 
in the Caribbean, such as the IMF, UNDP, IDB, ECLAC, CARICO.M and ÜECS 
SetretáriatS, Is also to be noted. 
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Tlie Caribbean and its relationships to the 
Third World 
Caribbean traditional links with the Third World derive mainly 
from the fact that large quantities of workers first in the form of 
slaves and later as indentured workers were transported to the 
Caribbean from Afro-Asia. The negro slave trade is considered by 
some historians to be one of the greatest migrations in recorded 
history.—^ l-Jhile precise figures regarding the slave trade are 
hard to come by, the orders of magnitude are illustrated by the 
estimate that between 1700-1786 Jamaica alone received 610,000 slaves 
and betwe<eti 1680-1776 Haiti and the Dominican Republic received 
800,000.—'' In the period 1838-1918 indentured immigrants from 
Asia constituted the bulk of new entrants to the work force, 
estimated for the English-speaking Caribbean countries but mainly 
18 / Trinidad and Guyana to be 425,000.— The five-fold increase in the 
population of Trinidad and Tobago between 1844 and 1911 is due 
19/ 
primarily to East Indian workers.— 
In both these phases the psychological links with the homelands 
were strong. The slaves were in fact kidnapped and removed against 
their will from Africa to labour under appalling conditions in the 
Caribbean. The East Indians travelled to the Caribbean with the 
objective of returning home and approximately 20 percent of them did 
so. Particularly among the slaves and ex-slaves the desire to return 
to Africa was strong and has remained in various politico-religious 
attitudes to the present time from Marcus Garvey to Rastafari. In 
fact some Caribbean intellectuals also moved to Africa making 
significant contributions in that continent in the process. Interestingly 
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the English-speaking Caribbean people moved to British Colonial 
Africa and the Haitians to French/Belgian Colonial Africa. The 
East Indians remaining in the Caribbean continued to preserve their 
culture and to follow the political and social developments in their 
homelands. 
As the process of British decolonization proceeded with India 
in the vanguard, to be followed closely by West Africa, emerging 
nationalist political elites in the Caribbean looked to lenders 
in these regions for example and for encouragement. And so 
paradoxically it is through the empire, and its affiliation with 
the Common^^J.th, that the English-speaking countries of the 
Caribbean entered into its first institutional linkages with 
Afro-Asia. But for those who could not identify with either 
Africa, Asia or Europe, for example the growing body of mulatto 
elites who were not accepted anywhere, for those impatient of any 
colonial linkages, and for thos attracted to the concepts of social 
justice advocated by the British Labour Party and the international 
socialist movement the non-aligned movement, provided a comforting 
haven since its concern with de-colonization, development, social 
justice, racial equality were also the pre-occupations of newly 
emerging Caribbean states. The founders of the movement Nehru, 
Nkrumah and Tito were already familiar to Caribbean leaders. 
Thus it emeirgea that while regionally contiguous to Latin America, 
in its interndtiotial relations with the Third World, the Caribbean 
has tetided fcb háVé á moire tiomprehensive set of linkages and share 
á ^téátéf ágehdá tít consenáüS with Afro-Asia. 
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Relations with Latin America while no doubt extensive under 
the Spanish empire declined somewhat in the twentieth century with 
the decline bf Spain and the emergence of the United States as the 
dominant force in the area. It has only re-emerged as an important 
aspect of Caribbean foreign relations since Cuba sought to distance 
herself from the United States and gain allies in Latin America on 
the one hand, and since the English-speaking countries emerged 
into independence and were required to take responsibility for 
dealing with contiguous states. In both cases initial relations had 
a negative impact though for different reasons. 
In the case of Cuba, the initial search for like minded countries 
in Latin America was unrewarded and policy therefore shifted to one 
of supporting revolutionary groups sympathetic to Cuba. This had the 
effect of further isolating Cuba from the constituted regimes reaching 
a nadir in 1964 with her expulsion from the OAS. In the 1970s Cuban 
effortSj In accordance with the global policies of detente^shif ted towards 
finding acceptance in the Latin American community and this was achieved, 
by her re-acceptance into the Latin American Group, the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with several countries, the lifting of OAS 
sanctions against her In 1975, and her full participation in SELA. 
Subsequent policy towards Latin America has been to try to secure 
the broad based gains of the 1970s, while increasing her support to 
those forces likely to create stronger bilateral alliances with Cuba 
in the future. 
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In the case of the English-speaking Caribbean relations with 
Latin America were conducted in a more defensive vein. In the first 
case territorial disputes existed between Guyana and Venezuela that 
denied Guyana full participation in the Inter-American System. 
Border disputes between Belize and Guatemala also retarded the process 
of Belize's move to independence. Both border disputes have mobilized 
CARICOM countries as a bloc against these Latin American states. The 
delimitation of fishing zones in the case of Trinidad and Venezuela 
and also between Jamaica and Colombia and Nicaragua provide further 
irritants while the delimitation of marine space has also lead some 
East Caribbean States to re-examine the validity of the Venezuelan 
% 
claim to Bird Island, off the coast of Dominica» since it greatly 
reduces any right they may have to the economic resources of the Caribbean 
Sea. 
At the same time the tempo of economic relations between the 
Caribbean and Latin America (primarily Mexico and Venezuela) quickened 
in the 1970s, due mainly to the fact that Caribbean countries, dependent 
on petroleum for energy, were entering into a period of financial 
stringency brought about by the same factor which contributed to the new 
wealth of Mexico and Venezuela. Thus in the nineteen seventies 
Venezuelan initiativés in the region were consolidated under the 
Programme for Co-operation with the Caribbean-PROCA- and the special 
fund for the Caribbean, and numerous bilateral agreements were signed 
with Caribbean states. Similarly Mexican bilateral co-operation 
agfeemeiits were signed in the 1970s with most Caribbean states, and 
With CABLlCOM, and Mexico joined the CDB as a contributor. The San José 
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accord of August 1980 linked Venezuela and Mexico to provide assistance 
to Jamaica, Barbados and the Dominican Republic through an oil facility 
which transformed 30 percent of the recipient countries' oil bills into 
credits. Although these agreements provided short-term assistance to 
Caribbean states in acute financial difficulty they also served notice 
of newly emerging middle powers in the Caribbean region. While emphasis 
is placed on Mexico and Venezuela relations with Colombia and Brazil 
have also been developed.—'' 
At the multilateral level Caribbean/Latin American relations have 
also been conducted through the Inter-American system, the Economic 
Commissioio- for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Latin 
« 
American Economic System (SELA). 
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The Quest for Economic and Social Development 
Historical analysis shows that Caribbean countries have been 
linked economically with Europe since the sixteenth century, and 
with North America since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The relationship has been one whereby the Caribbean specialized in 
the production of a narrow range of Agricultural staples for export 
to these countries and in turn imported manufactured articles from 
them. As a result the Caribbean has been vulnerable to the fluctuating 
prices of one or more internationally traded commodities with the 
attendant boom and slump conditions over which small producers had no 
control. Moreover, the region has had to cope with declining terms 
of trade, partly due to the fact that as their export staples moved 
through the product cycle, lower rents could be earned from them as 
they became mass consumption articles and new and more efficient 
producers were identified. So, not only did this style of development 
mean that export earnings were erratic but they tended to decrease 
in purchasing power over time. 
The export sector despite the risks Involved was nevertheless 
remunerative and history is vivid with stories of the profligate 
spending of the Caribbean planter following periods of boom as he 
besported himself iff London, Paris or Madrid. At the same time, the 
conditions of poverty under which the small peasant had to live while 
producing domestic food cpops, threw into sharp relief the dual nature 
of these ectlttOmlee. j Dualism was reflected, not only in the relative 
SCálfeá OÍ 
remiinétátlóri but also in the modes of organization, levels 
of tfecHtlBitigy, afccfess to capital and consequently output per worker. I ' 
In sum, while it was clear that surpluses were being generated the 
capacity to use these surpluses, to generate new productive capacity 
and so reduce dualism seemed to elude the policy-maker. 
Emerging nationalist elites facing these inequities, and they 
were endemic in all Caribbean states, sought to ascribe them to 
historical causes either to British colonialism in the English-speaking 
countries or to American Imperialism in the case of those that were 
already independent. Thus in the case of Cuba, perhaps the classical 
case of dualism with great disparities of wealth and uneven progress 
towards modernization, 'Yankee Imperialism' was blamed and a develop-
« 
ment path was chosen for Cuba after 1959 that would sever the economic 
links with the United States and hopefully at the same time the inequities 
in the society by reducing the dominance of export oriented 'King Sugar' 
which provided the focus of all the ills of dualism. 
It soom became clear to the new elites in Cuba that sugar was 
Cuba's main source of foreign exchange upon which the society depended 
to provide all those necessities not locally produced. Itoreover, the 
dramatic and decisive boycott of trade by the United States did not 
permit the illusion 
to grow that Cuba could survive in a closed economy 
model. While, therefore,attempting to diversify its productive structure 
it had the additional problem of re-orienting the direction of its trade. 
In 1958, 68 percent of merchandise trade was conducted with the USA and 
less than 1. percent with the USSR. By 1965 Cuban trade with the US was 
almost nil but had grown to 48 percent with the USSR. By 1982 trade 
With fché íiáSR afcfcoürited for 67 percent of total Cuban trade and trade 
with tHé US Miiccjíintéd for less than one-tenth of 1 percent. 
In the English-speaking Caribbean the policy-maker in newly 
independent societies had to grapple with the worst effects of 
22/ 
dualism and a rapidly rising unemployment. Sir Arthur Lewis— 
provided a plausible model which explained how the capitalist 
modern sector (which in the Caribbean case would be based on 
manufactures for export) could grow while absorbing the surplus 
labour of the non-capitalist subsistence sector. The transfer of 
labour would take place since the wage rate would be higher in the 
more productive sector. As the capitalist manufacturing sector 
expanded surpluses of capital would be created to generate new 
investment until there was no longer an excess of surplus Itibour. Wiile m 
A ftCóber of assumptions were made in the model, whlcli were not met in 
the real situation, the theory was extremely attractive to Caribbean 
governments, and with subsequent adaptations made from the 'Plantation 
School', forms the basis of policy until the present. 
The second major théme among economists of the English-speaking 
Caribbean was the 'Plantation School'. It held that the Plantation 
system, which had developed under colonialism, had certain characteristics 
it produced agricultural crops primarily for export, using unskilled 
23/ 
labour but with a core of supervisory/managerial skills.— But it was 
more than a mode <of production since it organized the social patterns I 
of its participants and conditioned their psychological processes. In 
its spatial dimension it was a social system in the territory in which 
it operated, and an economic system which linked the territory in which 
it tiperated with the wider world community, through its export orientation 
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and foreign ownership. A plantation economy was one in which 
"the internal and external dimensions of the plantation system 
dominate the country's economic, social and political structure 
ryt / 
and its relations with the rest of the world."— The model 
also linked trade with exploitation and plunder and seemed to 
25 / 
imply that development could only take place with closure.— 
All countries in the Caribbean, were deemed to be plantation 
economies. It was held that while the initial benefits of the 
system were sufficient to move an economy from a state of undevelop-
ment to under-development it was never enougli to permit a move 
beyatid under-development, since it denied the majority of people 
a real stake in the county, and created a legacy of dependence 
which demotivated them. To break out of this trap it was 
considered necessary to dismantle the plantation system; establish 
a greater degree of closure in the economies; achieve a higher 
level of national ownership of land and capital assets; and, 26/ 
achieve regional economic integration.— 
Finally the Cuban model has had some influence on Caribbean 
elites particularly as regards the question of public ownership, 
the role of the state, and the possibilities of diversifying the 
traditional patterns of trade. Its attempts to alleviate the worst I 
effects of dualism through the provision of better education and 
health care and its efforts to increase the level of national parti-
cipatlofl by providing employment also struck a responsive chord in the 
minds tíf leaders in the English-speaking Caribbean, and seemed to I pfdVide a süccéfesful alteifnative model of development for some of them. 
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An evaluation of policy in Caribbean countries will with few 
2 7 / 
exceptions— contain elements of these various streams of thou^t, 
although in different combinations and with different emphases both 
in time and in space. 
Thus in the CARXCOM countries we see developmental strategies 
based on 'industrialization by invitation' producing a range of 
light manufactured articles for the CARICOM market behind a tariff 
wall. In fact the strategy was only sustainable because a number 
of outside producers decided that it might be profitable to establish 
some minimal processing in order to overcome the tariff wall and 
enter the market. Any economies of scale that might derive Prom n 
broaái^hlng of the market were limited since, given the economies 
of scale required for modern efficient mass production the CARICOM 
market was itself too small, particularly when its purchasing 
power was taken into account and is tantamount to the belief that 
the Dominican Republic is a market of sufficient size to foster a 
viable industrial programme based on a closed domestic market. 
Moreover, since there was no co-ordination at the regional level 
there was a scramble by member states to produce the most obvious 
and therefore the same items for domestic production with the 
illogical assumption that they would also have a Targe share of the 
regional market. There was therefore no attempt at specialization 
based on efficiency criteria, with the result that massive 
over-capacity developed and the tendency to preserve markets for 
inéffidifent dorae§tic producers was encouraged since they were incapable 
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of penetrating third country markets. Governments pre-occupied with 
emplo3rment considerations would not allow inefficient enterprises to 
fade out and so they became a burden on private consumers either directly 
or through government subsidies. • 
The second major plank of policy was the quest for national 
economic control or more elegantly stated "to control the commanding 
hights of the economy". Often the concept of control was used synomously 
with ownership. Thus the quest by governments to acquire existing 
economic assets, even the declining economic assets. The arp,uments for 
National Economic Control ware conditioned by the debate on Political 
control and the granting of Economic power and benefits to national elites. 
But they were also conditioned by a desire to reduce the risks and 
complexities attendant on participation in the international markets, 
and by a desire to reduce the iniquities of dualism. In this case 
there was a convergence with the goal of moving from Agricultural to 
Industrial production following the model popularized by Lewis. The 
arguments for national control essentially made the case for economic 
closure either total or partial, either national, or in a modified form, 
within the framework of a Caribbean Regional Market. 
The third major plank of policy was employment, its preservation 
and its creation. Given the obvious high and growing unemployment 
and the trades union background of many of the political elites this 
preoccupation is easily understood. Nevertheless, the preservation of jobs 
was often, usedto justify the survival of inefficient enterprises and to 
justify the postponement of technological change. Thus when it \<ias 
already obVioUS that the sugar industry was no longer internationally 
cbttipetitivé, the opportunities to upgrade its efficiency were lost for 
fear of the effect it would have on sugar cane cutters. The preoccupation 
with job creation was used to justify the establishment of enterprises 
that were not efficient and were in some cases net users of foreign exchange. 
These three major planks of policy were only possible because up 
until the end 1970s (and in the case of Trinidad up until the early 1980s) 
large foreign exchange inflows, primarily from minerals, but also in 
tourism and sporadic agricultural commodity booms, could be taken for 
granted. Thus an inefficient import substitution programme was possible 
instead of one to earn foreign exchange on the world market, as had been 
the Arthur Lewis intention. 
The arguments for economic insulation and closure were also developed 
in period of large foreign capital Inflows. These inflows produced 
the conditions to justify ecpnomic nationalism since key growth sectors 
primarily in minerals, but also in some manufactures, had developed and 
were in the control of foreign hands. But it was also an availability 
of foreign exchange which permitted governments to acquire many of the 
economic assets in sugar, bauxite and the petro-chemical industries and 
it was this which allowed the growth of the government apparatus and 
public expenditures of the 1970s. It was abundant foreign exchange 
that allowed the subsidization of employment, latent in inefficient 
industry, oveít In public works programmes= 
The early 1970s provided a watershed. Foreign Investment, primarily 
from the Uriítéd States, had started to decline partly because the United 
States currency tjas HO longer overvalued. At the same time the cost of 
feriérgy started té Incréase drastically for those dependent on imported 
petirbieiim; THe true significance of these developments was lost to 
Cáiritiijeári gdVértlméhtfe £oif Boñte tine, since one was a beneficiary of the 
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OPEC p r i c e i nc r eases , and o the rs 'be l ieved that f o r t h e i r products they 
would be ab l e to emulate the OPEC example thus the spawning of producers 
a s s o c i a t i o n s such as GEPLACEA, UBEC and IBA f o r sugar, bananas and bauxi te 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . In the f i r s t case economic a c t i v i t y p red i ca ted on l o c a l 
or r e g i ona l markets has been f inanced w i th the w i n d f a l l ga ins from petroleum, 
up u n t i l the p resent . In the second case i n i t i a l gains from emulating 
OPEC for example the Jamaican bauxite levy strengthened the tendency for 
economic i s o l a t i o n i s m and pub l i c s ec to r c on t r o l w i th the at tendant rap id 
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inc rease in pub l i c s e c t o r expend i tures . 
In the e a r l y 1970s one t h e r e f o r e saw cons ide rab l e surpluses from 
expor t commodities accru ing once aga in to Caribbean coun t r i e s . The 
• -rjf ' r 
d i f f e r e n c e in th i s ins tance 
was that the surpluses were now a v a i l a b l e in 
the form of government revenues. In both cases inmiediate e f f o r t s were made 
to inc rease the l e v e l o f employment through pub l i c works programmes. In 
Jamaica the r o l e and c a p a b i l i t y o f Government was a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
expanded i . e . government consumption inc reased . In Tr inidad and Tobago 
the l e v e l o f government investment increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y i . e . massive 
investments were put i n t o p l ace to inc r ease downstream a c t i v i t i e s of the 
pe t ro -chemica l indus t ry , though emphasis was seemingly placed more on the 
t e chn i ca l ra ther than the f u t u r e f i n a n c i a l v i a b i l i t y o f these e n t e r p r i s e s . 
By the tn id-sevent ies OPEC p o l i c i e s had s t a r t e d to reduce economic 
a c t i v i t y iti the deve loped c o u n t r i e s , which accentuated the trend o f 
reduced investment abroad and reduced t h e i r demand f o r imported minera l s . 
The Caribbean o i l import ing coun t r i e s (which were h e a v i l y dependent on 
o i l f b t er ié tgy ) Were f aced w i th dramatic inc reases in the p r i c e of imported 
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energy , f i r s t in 1973 but more s e r i o u s l y in 1979-1980, thus on the one 
hand c r ea t ing s t agge r ing inc reases i n f o r e i g n exchange expendi tures 
and on the o ther haüd reducing earnings by render ing energy i n t e n s i v e 
29 / 
i n d u s t r i e s l e s s c o m p e t i t i v e . — The phi losophy of economic na t i ona l i sm 
f u r t h e r accentuated the problem by. j u s t i f y i n g huge increases in the 
pub l i c sec to r w i th the concomitant e f f e c t on f o r e i g n exchange outflo^^;s, 
and a t the same time c r e a t i n g uncer ta in ty in the minds of p o t e n t i a l 
f o r e i g n and l o c a l i n v e s t o r s . 
The pauc i ty o f f o r e i g n exchange served to focus a t t e n t i o n on the 
f a c t that i t had been used to subs id i z e emplo3mient and the growth of 
a non-product ive pub l i c s e c t o r . The i n i t i a l response o f governments 
« 
to t h i s scenar io was to f u r t h e r c l o s e t h e i r economies and to f i nance 
d e f i c i t s on the assumption that the problems were e s s e n t i a l l y shor t - t e rm. 
Governments a l s o assumed that by so doing they could i n su l a t e the domestic 
environment from the changes tak ing p l a c e in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy. 
In f a c t these p o l i c i e s have on l y served to p lace Caribbean economies ten 
years behind t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c ompe t i t o r s . 
Some count r i e s such as the Bahamas and the Nether lands A n t i l l e s chose 
d i f f e r e n t development s t r a t e g i e s and moved d i r e c t l y i n t o the export o f 
s e r v i c e s , mainly tour ism, f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s , and petroleum r e f i n i n g . In 
the A n t i l l e s these were supplemented by ship r e p a i r and transhipment of 
petroleum. While these s e c t o r s are h i g h l y vu lne rab l e to ex t e rna l economic 
cond i t i ons emphasis on the expor t o f s e r v i c e s has served these count r i e s 
w e l l , GDP/caplta f o r the Nether lands A n t i l l e s be ing h ighes t 
in the r eg i on 
and the Bahamas being t h i r d , j u s t a f t e r Tr in idad and Tobago, the only o i l 
expor t e r in the r e g i o n . 
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The Present Socio-economic S i t u a t i o n 
Desp i t e the d i f f e r e n t approaches t r i e d by Caribbean governments the 
l a s t i n g Impression i s however the s i m i l a r i t y of the outcome. For 
in the 1980s the s t ruc tu r e s and problems o f most Caribbean count r i e s a re 
the same. In the 1980s most CDCC c o u n t r i e s have faced chronic d e f i c i t s 
in t h e i r balance o f payments; and they are s t i l l dependent on one or a 
few i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y traded expor t products in which the i r comparative 
advantage i s d e c l i n i n g . 
In the t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l crops t h i s s h i f t in comparative 
advantage was noted a t the turn o f the century in the case of sugar 
where the emphasis on product ion s h i f t e d from Jamaica, Barbados and H a i t i 
to CubaT^the Dominican Republ ic and Guyana. Subsequently the s h i f t has . 
been away from Caribbean producers to non- reg iona l sugar cane producers 
but mainly to o ther sources o f sugar such as corn syrup and beet sugar. 
The f a c t that sugar cont inues to be produced in the Caribbean i s due to 
p r e f e r e n t i a l arrangements which have been nego t i a t ed to susta in p r i c e s 
on the one hand and the i n a b i l i t y o f the count r i e s to f ind l ead i l y a v a i l a b l e 
a l t e r n a t i v e sources o f f o r e i g n exchange on the o t h e r . Thus d e sp i t e a 
conscious i n i t i a l p o l i c y by Cuba, the main sugar producer in the r e g i on 
to reduce the r o l e of sugar, the s i t u a t i o n a f t e r more than 20 years i s that 
sug i r maintains i t s .dominance. In 1958 Cuba's raw sugar product ion was 6.8 
m i l l i o n tons from which i t d e r i v ed 80.6 percent o f i t s expor t earnings but 
in 1980 i t was 6.7 m i l l i o n tons and accounted f o r 83,7 percent of expor t 
income» I t was n e v e r t h e l e s s ab l e to reduce the r i s k attendant on the wor ld 
lilarket f o r t h i s tommodity as w e l l as i t s d e c l i n i n g returns by n e g o t i a t i n g 
pre i f ferent ia l arrangements w i t h i n the CEMA and mainly to the Sov i e t Union 
which in 1981 purchased 2 3 percent o f t h e i r e xpo r t s . For the l a t t e r ha l f 
o f the 1970s Cuba was ab l e to ob t a in p r i c e s from the USSR f o r i t s sugar 
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averag ing three t imes the wor ld market p r i c e 
S im i l a r l y , the CARICOM su ^ r producers were a l s o ab l e to n e g o t i a t e 
p r e f e r e n t i a l p r i c e s f o r i t s sugar under the Lomé Convention and some of 
those, as w e l l as the Dominican Republic, b e n e f i t e d from the advantageous 
p r i c e paid under the United S ta t es Sugar Quota f o r s a l e s to that market, 
Table 1 
Sugar Product ion 
( '000 ' Tonnes) 
1972 1981 Percent; change 
Barbados 113.3 94 -17 .0 
Cubai^ 5,763 7.926 + 37.5 
-
2/ 
Dominican Repub l i c - 992 513.2 -48 .3 
Guyana 322.3 306 - 5 . 0 
H a i t i 65.9 51.6 -21 .7 
Jamaica 380.8 205. - 46 .2 
Tr in idad and Tobago 235.5 93. -60 .5 
1/ Product ion f i g u r e f o r 1971. 2/ Exports . 
Sptitce; Var ious ECLÁC country surveys . 
Sugaf thug témains an important though d e c l i n i n g expor t industry f o r 
many Caribbeatt cdunt r i eS . Cuba, and to a l e s s e r ex tent the Dominican 
Rept ibl lcaré S t i l l hbwéver dependent upon t h i s commodity as i t s major source 
d i feXfidtt earriihgSi 
- A l f -
Likewise banana product ion has been s u f f e r i n g a d e c l i n e 
in output desp i t e p r e f e r e n t i a l arrangements a v a i l a b l e to CARICOM 
producers . Once aga in the problem i s a l a ck o f p r i c e compet i t i v eness 
and i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y c o n t r o l i n the f a c e o f more recent producers mainly in 
A f r i c a but a l s o in Centra l America,.and product ion i s ab l e to cont inue 
on ly because of s p e c i a l p r e f e r e n t i a l arrangements in the United Kingdom 
market. 
Table 2 
Bauxite/Alumina Product ion 
( ' 000 Tonnes) 
• 
BAUXITE ALUMINA 
Country 1972 1982 % i Change 1972 1982 % 
Dominican Republic 1207.1 140.5 -88 .3 - - -
Guyana 2392 1509.0 - 37 .0 266 170 - 3 6 . 1 
H a i t i 705 622Í/ -11 .7 - - -
Jamaica 12,372 8,521 - 3 1 . 1 1805 1763 - 2 . 3 
Suriname 4751^/ 4125 - 1 3 . 2 2/ 1248 10.4 
j^/ Sale o f invent i ons p r i o r to c l o s u r e . 
F igures r e l a t e to product ion f o r 1975, 
Source: ECLAC, IBEID. 
The other mainstay of Caribbean expor t ea rn ings , m inera l s , i s a l s o 
wittteSBing a s h i f t in comparat ive advantage . In the case of baux i te/ 
alumina Caribbean output has been a f f e c t e d by dep l e t ed o r e in the case o f 
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H a i t i which no l onger produces baux i t e , but p r i n c i p a l l y by a s h i f t 
in energy cos ts which have made o l d smel t ing p l an t s on the East Coast 
o f the United S ta t e s , f o r which Caribbean ore was des t ined , uneconomical. 
The reduced demand f o r alumina in OECD count r i e s has necess i t a t ed a 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of p roduct ion , the s t ruc tu r e of which w i l l probably be, 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t a f t e r demand r e v i v e s , than i t was b e f o r e . 
Comparative advantage w i l l t h e r e f o r e s h i f t to those count r i es having 
baux i t e depos i t s in c l o s e p rox im i t y to cheap sources of energy, such as 
A u s t r a l i a , Venezuela , B r a z i l and Suriname. 
In Tr in idad and Tobago the on ly Caribbean o i l producer, the output 
o f c r H d ^ p i l peaked in 1977-78, and the d e c l i n e in the 1980s i s marked, 
m 
an 11 percent d e c l i n e between 1980-1981 f o l l owed by a fu r the r 6 percent 
d e c l i n e in 1982. At the same time p r i c e s have so f t ened in the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l petroleum markets. A s i m i l a r l y depressed s i t u a t i o n f a c e s 
o i l r e f i n e r i e s l o ca t ed in the Caribbean which had been es tab l i shed to 
s e r v i c e the United S ta tes East Coast . A s h i f t in sources o f supply, 
demand pa t t e rns and energy s t r a t e g y means that the oppor tuni ty of the 
current c y c l i c a l downturn i s be ing used to e s t a b l i s h new r e f i n e r i e s 
on the United Sta tes mainland. I t must not t h e r e f o r e be assumed that 
when demand r e v i v e s the o l d r e f i n e r i e s in the Caribbean w i l l re turn to 
normal product ion . 
While the focus has t h e r e f o r e been on world r e cess i on , with the 
assumption that c ond i t i ons w i l l r e turn to normal once demand r e v i v e s , 
t h i s foGuS d i s gu i s e s 
the j process o f adap ta t i on , change, and t rans format ion 
i ihieh i s utidétWáy and wh|.ch w i l l adve r se l y a f f e c t the export earnings 
bf Éátibbeátt eduti tr iég f i r the f u t u r e . 
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The sale of services, primarily through the tourist industry is 
the most widespread earner of foreign exchange in Caribbean countries. 
The exceptions to this are Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
In all other countries it is being actively promoted. 
In the 1980s Caribbean tourism has suffered from depressed economic 
conditions in OECD countries and strong price competition from adjacent 
destinations, such as Mexico. The industry is also sensitive to political 
events and the perceptions of prospective visitors regarding the prevailing 
a t t i t u d e s o f the host popu la t i on , and govenment, to them. One or other 
of these factors has affected all Caribbean destinations. With few 
exceptions there has been a decline in tourist arrivals and in visitor 
expenditures. Increases in Jamaica are symptomatic of a recovery from 
previous years where political events depressed the industry. Similarly 
depressed conditions were to be observed in Grenada until recently. The 
political variable also helps to explain the relatively small size of the 
31/ 
industry i n Cuba, which in 1980 r e c e i v ed almost 129,50CF— t o u r i s t s , 
d e s p i t e be ing the major Caribbean d e s t i n a t i o n in the 1950s. Cuba 
neve r the l e s s s t i l l r e c e i v e s almost 80 percent of i t s t o u r i s t s from 
des t i na t i ons which i t d e f i n e s as c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . 
The growing i n f l u e n c e o f the s e r v i c e s i n d u s t r i e s i s to be noted 
in the Bahamas, and í l e ther lands A n t i l l e s p r i m a r i l y in s e r v i c e s such as 
o f f s h o r e banking and the r e g i s t r a t i o n of o f f s h o r e companies. This l a t t e r 
a c t i v i t y , f o r example, earned ove r US$171 m i l l i o n in revenues in Curagao 
f o r 1983> a f i g u r e g r e a t l y in excess of the current income of any DECS 
¿bvérftmerit and compates w i th a current income of Barbados of US$218 
fn i i l idr i in thé 1982-83 f i s c a l y ea r . 
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Tab le 3 
S e l e c t e d Fo r e i gn Earnings (1980) 
(US$m) 
Country P r i v a t e Unequited Balance on T r a v e l 
T r a n s f e r s Account 
Dominican Republ ic 183, .0 166, •0 
H a i t i 31. .3 50, .6 
Jamaica 81. ,7 229, .0 
Saint Chr i s topher/Nev is 16. ,0 14, .3 
Nether lands A n t i l l e s -45 . ,3 578. .8 
T r in idad and Tobago -64 . .9 11. ,6 
Source: ECLAC, IMF. 
F i n a l l y a word needs a l s o t o be sa id about the f o r e i g n ea rn ings 
r e c e i v e d from Caribbean peop l e abroad, an i tem s u b s t a n t i a l l y covered 
by the heading P r i v ed Unequited T r a n s f e r s in the Balance-of-Payinents 
t a b l e s . A comparison i s made w i th ea rn ings f rom tour ism, in some s e l e c t e d 
Caribbean c o u n t r i e s , to i n d i c a t e i t s r e l a t i v e importance in the f o r e i g n 
earn ings o£ those c o u n t r i e s . ( T a M e 3 ) . The case o f the Nether lands 
A n t i l l e s and T r in idad and Tobago i s i n t e r e s t i n g s ince the n e g a t i v e f l o w s 
a re to the b e n e f i t o f some OECS s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g Sa in t Chr i s t opher/Nev i s , 
Grenada and Sa in t V incen t . Whi l e f i g u r e s f o r r emi t t ances from Cubans l i v i n g 
abroad a r e not a v á i l a b l e , e f f o r t s to encourage e x p a t r i a t e Cubans to v i s i t 
Cuba peaked i n 1979 when 102,000 Cubans re turned f o r v i s i t s , in that year 
a lmost 54 percent o f t o t a l v i s i t o r s . The number o f Cubans v i s i t i n g t h e i r 
homeland has subsequent ly d e c l i n e d however and s tood a t 8,000 in 1982 or 
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7.6 pe rcen t o f t o t a l a r r i v a l s . — The e x p a t r i a t e Cuban community n e v e r t h e l e s s 
remains a s i g n i f i c a n t source or p o t e n t i a l r e s e r v o i r , o f f o r e i g n ea rn ings f o r 
Cuba, i t may alse) be noted tha t r em i t t ances a re in some cases a f f e c t e d by 
p o l i t i c á l p e r c e p t i o n s and those r e l a t i n g to the p r e v a i l i n g investment c l i m a t e . 
tti thó Gáeé Ibf Jamaica, íé i t i i s tances d e c l i n e d by 92 percent between 1970-1976 
but inc reased by 728 percent between 1978-1982.—^ 
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Table A 
Summary of Balance of Payments 1980 
(US$m) 
Country Balance o f 
Merchandise Trade 
Balance on Current 
Account Basic Balance 
Barbados -314 -19 20 
Bahamas -639 -13 -5 
Cuba-^ -660 n .a . n .a . 
Dom. Republic -558 -674 33 
H a i t i -101 -108 -12 
Jamaica -75 -175. 69. 
Grenada -95 -42. - 1 
Surxname 60.0 -58. 26 ^ 
Tr inidad and 
Tobago 592. 455 614 
Netherlands 
A n t i l l e s -735 18 27 
1/ M i l l i o n s of Cuban pesos . Annuario Es tad í s t i c o 1982. 
Source: ECLAC country r epo r t s . 
Table 4 g i v e s a summary v iew of the balance of payments of a r ep r e sen ta t i v e 
s e l e c t i o n o f CDCC count r i e s . With few exceptions, notably the only petroleum 
exporter Tr inidad and Tobago,the balance on merchandise trade i s nega t i v e , as 
i s the balance on current account though earnings from s e r v i c e s in t h i s case 
< 
tends to reduce the d e f i c i t . 
Capi ta l f l ows t h e r e f o r e form an important part of ex te rna l f i n a n c i a l 
a c t i v i t y , comprised o f e i t h e r d i r e c t investment f l o w s , loans or g rants . In the 
l a t e s ix t i es .expans io t t in Caribbean countr i es was f inanced pr imar i l y by d i r e c t 
investment f l ows i In the l a t t e r part of the s even t i e s and ea r l y e i g h t i e s the 
i á t t e i : two opt ions haVe predominated, grants going mainly to the OECS countr ies 
«uiílHaHiii MMtl tha NestherlandB A n t i l l e s . For tlie l a r g e r countr ies the in t e rna t i ona l 
c a p i t a l markets have prov ided the major source of balance o f payments support 
wi th the at tendant e f f e c t upon t h e i r deb t . 
Table 5 
Se l ec t ed Debt I n d i c a t o r s 




s e r v i c e s 
1980 
Dominican Republic 14.5 17.5 4.5 21.5 
H a i t i 10.3 18.5 5.8 4 .2 
Jamaica 11.5 54.1 2.5 12.8 
Tr in idad and Tobago 12.5 9 .0 4 .4 2.2 
vwf.,-
Source: World Development Report 1982. 
As Caribbean economies a re expor t p r o p e l l e d the poor performance of the 
export s ec to r had a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on pub l i c f i n a n c e s , and l e v e l s of employment. 
In 1982 Domestic demand exceeded GDP i n a l l c oun t r i e s f o r which data are a v a i l a b l e , 
except Tr in idad and Tobago, and domestic sav ings were ab l e to f inance on ly a small 
part o f domestic investment . In many coun t r i e s recurrent pub l i c revenues were 
i n s u f f i c i e n t to susta in r ecur ren t pub l i c expend i tures . 
As a r e s u l t many Caribbean count r i e s found i t necessary to enter in to 
agreements w i th the IMF e i t h e r f o r standby Agreements; Compensatory Financing 
F a c i l i t i e s or Extended Fund F a c i l i t i e s , a n d the re was by 1984 a genera l 
percept ion that Caribbean problems were s t r u c t u r a l and deepseated and would 
requ i re some fundamental r e - th ink ing o f p o l i c y . 
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Policies for the Future 
Table 6 
Se l e c t ed Caribbean Countr ies - I n d i c a t o r s o f Openness 
1981 
Country Imports^''' Exports—^ 
Barbados 71.0 61.3 
2/ Cuba-' 38.9 32.6 
Dominican Republ ic 25.2 20.9 
Jamaica>yp^ 58.4 47.9 
S t . Chr is topher/Nev is 115.4 50.1 
Saint Lucia 107.4 63.1 
Tr in idad and Tobago 31.5 38.8 
1! Goods and n o n - f a c t o r s e r v i c e s as a percentage o f 
Gross Domestic Product . 
y Merchandise imports and expor t s as a percentage 
o f To t a l M a t e r i a l Product . 
Source: ECLAC, IBRD. 
As w i l l be noted from Tab le 5, vjhich g i v e s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sample 
o f Caribbean c oun t r i e s , they e x h i b i t a high l e v e l o f openness which i s 
exp la ined by t h e i r small s i z e and narrow resource base. As a r e s u l t , 
they must s p e c i a l i z e i n the product ion o f a r e l a t i v e l y narrow range o f 
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good f f—fo r export in o rder to be ab l e to purchase the wide range of 
itetnS that cannot be produced l o c a l l y . 
A 
-5 I.-
The cho i ce o f i tems f o r product ion i s t h e r e f o r e c r i t i c a l so as 
to ensure that f o r e i g n exchange income i s maximized. P o l i c y f o r the 
past two decades has tended to f ocus on import s u b s t i t u t i o n of manu-
f a c t u r e s , w i thout no tab l e success and there i s now abundant ev idence 
to show that i t r e q u i r e s more domestic resources to save one unit o f 
f o r e i g n exchange through l o c a l s u b s t i t u t e s than to earn i t through 
expor ts . Moreover , those t a r i f f and quota p o l i c i e s which have been 
adopted in o rder to promote the s u b s t i t u t i o n o f l o c a l l y assembled 
consumer manufactures ' f o r imported ones, have a l s o had the e f f e c t of 
d i s c r im ina t ing aga ins t the development o f domestic food product ion, the 
area in which import s u b s t i t u t i o n w i l l be r e l a t i v e l y e f f i c i e n t . Recent 
World B^ifk* s tud i es i n d i c a t e that i n the Dominican Republ ic i t c os t s 
RD$2 - R D $ 4 to s u b s t i t u t e f o r US$1 o f imports o f manufactures, but 
RD$1.05 - RD51.22 to earn one US$ o f e xpo r t s . Moreover , in some a g r i -
cu l tu ra l expor t s u b s t i t u t i o n a c t i v i t i e s , i t c o s t s l e s s than one RI).$ to 
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subs t i tu t e f o r one US$.— 
While the examples c i t e d r e l a t e to a p a r t i c u l a r case and wh i l e 
t a r i f f and quota p o l i c i e s may vary in d e t a i l from one country to the next 
they are fundamental ly q u i t e s i m i l a r . They have t h e r e f o r e produced a 
common scenar io o f s tagnat ing expor t performance and inc reas ing i n a b i l i t y 
to s a t i s f y the demand f o r f ood from domestic p roduc t i on . In the decade 
1970-1980 the per c a p i t a c o s t o f imported food increased by JO percent 
This comment i s o f p a r t i c u l a r r e l e vance to the CARICOM count r i e s which 
have developed a se t o f h igh c o s t ' s c r e w d r i v e r i n d u s t r i e s ' w h i l e p e n a l i z i n g 
intra-CÁRICOM a g r i c u l t u r a l development, an area of g r ea t p o t e n t i a l t r ade . 
At thé same time i t needs to be recogn i zed that the present and fu tu r e 
p o t e n t i a l of t rade w i t h i n CARICOM i s r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d and expor t 
expansion w i l l t h e r e f o r e need to be p red i ca t ed on extra-CARICOM markets.. 
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Further d i s i n c e n t i v e s to expor t may a l s o be seen in the f o r e i g n 
exchange regimes p r e v a i l i n g in most c o u n t r i e s . With only a few 
except ions p a r i t i e s a r e maintained a t a r t i f i c a l l y high r a t e s through 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s . Th is f a c t has been made more g l a r i n g and 
urgent in recent t imes because o f the upward f l o a t of the US d o l l a r 
to which most Caribbean cur r enc i e s a re pegged a t a f i x e d r a t e . While 
an overva lued currency might not p e n a l i z e some o f the t r a d i t i o n a l 
export s t a p l e s which a r e traded w i th s p e c i a l l y nego t i a t ed arrangements 
i t does — p e n a l i z e n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l expor ts in s e r v i c e s such as tourism 
and in a g r i c u l t u r e where a good p o t e n t i a l f o r expansion e x i s t s . But a 
f u r t h e r d i s i n c e n t i v e t o expor t i s c rea ted by cumbersome a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
% 
controi'M^on i t s a c q u i s i t i o n , which converse l y a l s o ac t as an i n c e n t i v e • 
to c a p i t a l f l i g h t . 
For the most par t pub l i c sec to r performance has been poor . In 
most cases the focus has been on non-product ive or even counte r -produc t i ve 
r e gu l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s and pub l i c s e c t o r consumption has grown r a p i d l y . 
In Jamaica, f o r ins tance , i t has grown from 7 percent to 21 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1960 and 1980. For a comparable 
per iod i t expanded from 9 percent to 17 percent o f GDP i n Tr in idad . 
Concomitant ly , Gross Domestic Investment which grew in Jamaica at an 
annual average o f 7.,8 percent per annum in the decade of 1960-1970 
averaged minus 9.5 percent between 1970 and 1980."~~ Recurrent government 
expendi tures w i l l need to be reduced to l i b e r a t e r esources , both human 
and f inanc ia l^ f o r p roduct ion . A c a r e f u l l ook w i l l need to be taken at 
the capac i t y as w e l l as the e f f i c a c y o f small s t a t e s to susta in pub l i c 
sec tor , s t ruc tures which d i f f e r on ly in s c a l e , from those e x i s t i n g in the 
l a r g e deve loped c o u n t r i e s . 
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In cases where the pub l i c s e c t o r has become invo l ved in p r oduc t i v e 
a c t i v i t i e s performance has not been p a r t i c u l a r l y encouraging. In i t s 
i n i t i a l s t ages , p r o j e c t s a re o f t e n not eva luated wi th s u f f i c i e n t r i g ou r 
to ensure f i n a n c i a l v i a b i l i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y where the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets a re concerned. Subsequently, they are not 
managed or monitored w i th enough r i g ou r to ensure v i a b i l i t y or they may 
be o r i en t ed to concea led , confused or c o n f l i c t i n g g o a l s , such as the 
p r o v i s i on o f an i m p l i c i t subsidy to the pub l i c . 
Where i t i s deemed necessary f o r the publ ic s ec to r to become invo l ved 
in product i ve investments , f o r example when the p r i v a t e s e c t o r i s 
unw i l l i ng to take the r i s k , (a l though t h i s r i s k e va lua t i on i s o f t e n 
correctY'^as proved by subsequent e v e n t s ) the necessary d i s c i p l i n e s 
w i l l need to be e x e r c i s e d to ensure that such e n t e r p r i s e s can cover the 
oppor tun i ty cos t o f the necessary r esources . These cons ide ra t i ons are o f 
course p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t s ince the pub l i c sec to r in small s t a t e s has 
a tendency to become i n v o l v e d in r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e p r o j e c t s . 
But l a r g e pub l i c s e c t o r p r o j e c t s are l i k e l y a l s o to be s e v e r e l y 
constra ined due to the i n a b i l i t y o f some governments to incur new 
ex t e rna l debt o r , even where such funding i s a v a i l a b l e , to prov ide 
domestic counterpar t funds . At the same time the capac i t y of government 
to inc rease sav ings through Increased personal taxes cannot be taken 
f o r granted s ince some coun t r i e s a l r eady have a high tax burden, as 




Tax Revenue as a Percentage o f GDP 
Country Tax burden 
Barbados 24.2 
Dominican Republ ic 8.5 
H a i t i 9.2 
Jamaica 28.8 
Tr in idad and Tobago 27.3 
Whi le the capac i t y to i n c r ease income taxes i s uneven in the^ Caribbean 
the arguments as to whether to inc r ease income or consumption taxes must 
be c a r e f u l l y we ighted . Whatever the arguments may be, i t i s c l e a r in a l l 
cases that domestic sav ings a r e Inadequate to genera te the l e v e l s of 
a c t i v i t y needed to reduce the high unemployment p r e v a i l i n g in most 
count r i es and so f o r the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , e x t e rna l sav ings w i l l need 
to be used as a supplement to domestic e f f o r t s . But f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
has some shor t - te rm b e n e f i t s which might inc lude up - t o -da t e techniques and 
market in f o rmat i on . In the form of j o i n t ventures i t a l s o holds out the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a l l ow ing l o c a l p a r t i c i p a n t s to acqu i r e en t r ep reneur i a l 
and managerial s k i l l s and p rov ides a hedge aga ins t r i s k . But in the f i n a l 
ana l y s i s s t ruc tu ra l t rans fo rmat ion must mean g r e a t l y increased investment 
and t h i s must imply a g r e a t e r measure of domestic sav ings and reduced 
consumption. On the o the r hand i t must a l s o inc lude an improved investment 
c l ima te to make i t e a s i e r and more p r o f i t a b l e f o r l o c a l peop le to produce. 
Measures w i l l need to be taken to channel investment a c t i v i t y in to the 
r equ i red areas without the current s t u l t i f y i n g bureaucra t i c procedures. 
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Publ ic p o l i c y and planning w i l l i n sum need to be more s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
in the way in which the e x t e r n a l s e c t o r i s incorporated i n t o development 
s t r a t e g y . I t must t h e r e f o r e s t r i v e to r e c r e a t e an environment in which 
l a t e n t en t r epreneur ia l t a l e n t w i l l deve lop l ead ing to an inc r ease in 
p roduc t i v e investment, opt imal u t i l i z a t i o n of resources and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
to make use o f those o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r expor t to th i rd country markets. 
Table 8 
Se l e c t ed Soc i a l I n d i c a t o r s 
Adult 
l i t e r a c y 
% 
L i f e 
expectancy 
F e r t i l i t y 
r a t e (1981) 
In fan t 




Cuba 95 73 2.2 19 
m 
Dominican Republ ic 67 62 4.6 66 20.25 
H a i t i 23 54 4.7 112 11 .5 Í/ 
Jamaica 90 71 3.8 16 25.9 
Tr in idad and Tobago 95 72 2.5 31 10.4 
\ j A f i g u r e o f up to 40 percent may be de r i ved 
i f underemployment i s inc luded . 
Source: World Bank World Development Report 1983. 
In any developmental e f f o r t s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n needs to he placed 
on the development of human resources , a t the f i r s t l e v e l to p rov ide the 
bas i c c ond i t i ons o f hea l th and n u t r i t i o n to enable people to l i v e long 
and hea l thy l i v e s , and a t the second l e v e l to p rov ide the o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
f o r them td acqu i r e the necessary s k i l l s in order that they may be 
produfctive^ Table 8 s e t s out some s o c i a l i n d i c a t o r s o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
sample o f Caribbean c o u n t r i e s . I t w i l l be noted that wh i l e some coun t r i e s 
now a t t a i n i n d i c a t o r s of pr imary hea l th comparable to the deve loped 
_ 56 -
count r l e s there i s much which remains to be done in o the r s . And wh i l e 
the i n d i c a t o r s , f o r some count r i e s show that formal educat ion i s h igh, 
i t can be argued that development in the r e g i on i s as constra ined by a 
shortage o f s k i l l e d labour , not to mention managerial s k i l l s , as by a 
shortage o f c a p i t a l . A s i g n i f i c a n t po r t i on of the populat ion i s denied 
access to p roduc t i v e employment simply because i t l acks educat ion or 
e f f e c t i v e t r a i n i n g . Many w i th high l e v e l s o f educat ion moreover are 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y t ra ined as might be seen wi th the t r a i n i n g of pub l i c 
sec to r economists ra ther than business graduates , an emphasis on c o n t r o l 
ra ther than product ion . 
G a r i t e a n count r i es have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been d u a l i s t i c in nature . 
The process of development has been presented by some as the t r a n s i t i o n 
from the t r a d i t i o n a l to the modern s e c t o r . What i s now becoming c l e a r 
i s that t h i s t r a n s i t i o n comes about not merely by the t r ansp l an ta t i on 
of f a c t o r i e s or moderm machines but i s e s s e n t i a l l y a process occurr ing 
in the minds o f men. I t i s t h e r e f o r e a long term, and a permanent task, 
s ince one i s aiming a t a moving t a r g e t . 'Dual ism' w i l l t h e r e f o r e be a 
f a c t f o r a long time to come and any p lans w i l l t h e r e f o r e have to ca t e r 
f o r l a g g ing s e c t o r s . P o l i c i e s w i l l have to be s oph i s t i c a t ed enough to 
t a i l o r a se t of measures to deve lop the modern sec to r based on t rade to 
th i rd count r i e s wh i l e deve l op ing o the r a c t i v i t i e s e s s e n t i a l l y f o r 
domestic consumption and to maximize employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s . A range 
of products w i l l need to be found f o r t h i s s ec to r which can be produced 
w i th g r ea t e r Inputs of labour and r e l a t i v e l y l e s s t e chno logy/cap i ta l 
inputs . From t h i s group might come new innova t i v e products , but i t must 
a ldo be seen as one in t r a n s i t i o n to be absorbed over time in to more 
produc t i ve a c t i v i t i e s . 
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For the purpose o f t h i s d i scuss ion the ' domes t i c ' market i s used 
to r e f e r to the r e g i ona l market, in the f i r s t ins tance to CARICOM, but 
u l t i m a t e l y to inc lude the Caribbean in a wider sense. Good p o t e n t i a l 
f q r economic a c t i v i t y e x i s t s in t h i s area p a r t i c u l a r l y in the product ion 
o f goods to s a t i s f y bas ic needs. The r eg i on would seem to have the 
p o t e n t i a l to supply a l a r g e r par t o f i t s own f o od , c l o t h i n g , s h e l t e r 
c u l t u r a l needs without s i g n i f i c a n t i n e f f i c i e n c i e s . 
Intra-CARICOM trade i s p r e s en t l y constra ined by a shortage of 
f p r e i g n exchange and began i t s d e c l i n e in 1975, the year in which o i l 
p f i c e inc r eases f i r s t a f f e c t e d the ba lance-o f -payments o f Jamaica and 
Guyana. But the f a c t that a u s t e r i t y programmes impacted so s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
» 
ofi CARÍCOÍÍ produced goods r e f l e c t e d c e r t a i n under ly ing weaknesses in 
t|)e s t ruc ture o f CARICOM product ion . In short CARICOM r e f l e c t e d a 
s i f u a t i o n o f va r i ous enc laves o f na t i ona l product ion extending in to 
a Regional market r a the r than planned r e g i o n a l product ion f o r the CARICOM 
m^jrket. For the f u t u r e there w i l l be the need f o r a more i n t e g ra t ed 
r e g i ona l market w i th g r e a t e r in t ra -Gar ibbean compet i t i on f o r those 
products b e n f i t i n g from a p r o t e c t e d market. 
The burden o f earning f o r e i g n exchange w i l l however need to be 
assumed by a growing modern e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d s e c t o r . This w i l l encompass 
product ion o f export a g r i c u l t u r a l crops both t r a d i t i o n a l and n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l , 
s e l e c t ed manufactured i t ems , minera l expor ts and a growing s e r v i c e s 
indus t ry . A t t i t u d e s to the expor t s ec to r w i l l need to change, from the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s who p r e f e r to bask in the warmth of p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s 
f o r the r e g i ona l market, to the p lanners and i n t e l l e c t u a l s who regard 
the export Sector as a r e s i d u a l or p e r i p h e r a l a rea . 
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But most o f a l l p o l i c i e s l i k e the exchange con t r o l regimes which 
act as a d i s i n c e n t i v e to export product ion w i l l need to be dismantled 
since t h ^ c r e a t e p r e c i s e l y t j ie i l l s they are designed to prevent such as 
f o r e i g n exchange shor tages and f l i g h t o f c a p i t a l . The process o f r e a d j u s t -
ment w i l l need to be c a r r i e d out v;ith the g r e a t e s t of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n 
however i f f u r t h e r short run d i g l p c a t i o n s a re not to be c r ea t ed . 
T r a d i t i o n a l expor t crops have been granted a r e p r i e v e because of 
s p e c i a l p r i c i n g arrangements ^nd p ro t e c t ed markets without which they 
would long s ince have disappeared in the Caribbean. To some ex ten t 
maximum b e n e f i t has not beerj taken from these arrangements s ince they 
have had the e f f e c t o f s lowing down the necessary t e c h n o l o g i c a l t rans -
fo rmat ion . I f these t r a d i t i o n a l expor ts are to su r v i v e in the long run 
they w i l l need to be made more e f f i c i e n t . 
N o n - t r a d i t i o n a l h igh income e l a s t i c crops such as s p i c e s , 
h o r t i c u l t u r e and e x o t i c f r u i t and v e g e t a b l e s hold a good p o t e n t i a l f o r 
expor t to markets such aS tlie Ug and the EEC. There i s a l s o scope f o r 
ag ro - indus t ry based on loca l ly í -produced s p e c i a l i z e d f o ods , but even in the 
case o f crops which have been produced l o c a l l y f o r a long time new 
a t t i t u d e s to q u a l i t y cpp t r o l and jnarket i n f o rmat i on w i l l need to be 
deve loped i f they ave to compete s u c c e s s f u l l y in deve loped country markets. 
By world standards p roduc t i v e c apac i t y in the Caribbean i s minute so 
that s p e c i a l i z a t i o n n o v e l t y products becomes not on ly necessary but a l s o 
b e n e f i c i a l in that such products earn the h ighes t r e n t s . I t should be noted 
that a l l the now t r a d i t i o n a l expor t crops f e l l i n t o t h i s ca tegory in the 
e a r l y phases o f t h e i r prp^nct c y c l e . 
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Such manufacturing product ion as might be v i a b l e might c l u s t e r 
around e i t h e r indigenous raw m a t e r i a l s or a c t i v i t i e s where e x i s t i n g 
t r a d i t i o n a l s k i l l s can be s u i t a b l y updated and adapted to changing 
demand such as the garment indus t r y . But s i m i l a r l y in t h i s case i t 
w i l l be necessary to s p e c i a l i z e i . e . high f ash ion t r o p i c a l garments 
w i th a l a r g e component o f hand labour . 
Caribbean count r i e s have on the whole made a r e l a t i v e l y 
success fu l ent ry in to the market f o r s e r v i c e s . The a t t i t u d e s and 
pe rcep t i ons necessary to a n t i c i p a t e emerging trends and to c a p i t a l i z e 
once they are I d e n t i f i e d a re however unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d in the r eg ion , 
These a re deve loped not on ly by formal educat ion but, as in the case 
o f a l l a c t i v i t i e s in the h i gh l y f l u i d e x t e rna l markets, by constant 
exposure and awareness to market t r ends . Such exposure does not 
deve lop in count r i es which seek to c l o s e the channels of communication 
and trade w i th the world markets. In the i n i t i a l s t ages , and because 
r e l a t i v e l y small product ion runs might not be ab l e to susta in l a r g e 
expendi tures on market r esearch the e x i s t i n g f o r e i g n and t rade 
r ep r e s en ta t i v e s might have to be r e o r i e n t e d to ana lyse demand trends 
and prov ide s a l e s a s s i s t ance i n the deve loped count r i e s f o r emerging 
domestic e xpo r t e r s . 
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The r o l e of the CDCC 
As the CDCC en te r s i t s tenth year of e x i s t e n c e i t r e t a i n s a 
unique v i s i o n so w e l l expressed by the l a t e Dr. Er i c Wi l l i ams in 
May 1975, " t o dea l w i th Caribbean issues and circumstances and to 
embrace a l l Caribbean e n t i t i e s from B e l i z e to Cayenne, i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s " . The membership of CDCC i s wider than ever 
be fo re although i t i s by no means complete and more time w i l l be 
needed b e f o r e a l l p o t e n t i a l a c t o r s in the Wi l l i ams framework w i l l 
be convinced about the b e n e f i t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t p rov ides the 
forum which w i l l permit the l a r g e s t grouping o f smal l s t a t e s , w i th 
d i v e r s e c u l t u r a l o r i g i n s , y e t a l l p r e sen t l y so s im i l a r in composit ion 
and in'-1:h& problems they must s o l v e , to work to gather to f ash ion 
so lu t i ons f o r them. For as t ime passes i t becomes c l e a r that the 
peoples o f the r e g i on are complementing t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l l y outward 
v i s i o n w i th an inward one in an a t t e m p t ' t o r e s o l v e those uniquely 
r e g i o n a l problems determined by s i z e , l o c a t i o n and cu l tu re to which 
the ou ts ide has no conv inc ing answer. So we see a p o t e n t i a l grouping 
o f 25 Caribbean e n t i t l e s perhaps wi th d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
arrangements, a l l seeking answers to the same fundamental i ssues and 
c ircumstances. 
In a world in which the i n t e r a c t i o n between s t a t e s and other 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t o r s i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y more complex and in tense , 
a l l Caribbean s t a t e s a re no doubt anxious to know the fu ture of t h e i r 
nat ion s t a t e s as cu r r en t l y c o n s t i t u t e d . For wh i l e tlie boundiiries o f 
na t i ona l j u r i s d i c t i o n a re be ing eroded in even the l a r g e s t s t a t e s 
i t i s those small and open s t a t e s o f the Caribbean that f a c e the most 
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ser ious consequences o f t h i s e r o s i o n . They w i l l be the f i r s t to f a l l 
as c a s u a l t i e s i f t h i s e r o s i on cannot be ha l t ed . And i f i t i s found 
to be an immutable process f o r the s t a t e s the inhab i tants o f these 
i s l ands w i l l need to know what measures must be taken to p rese rve 
and deve lop those c u l t u r a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l elements necessary to 
susta in the fu tu re i n t e g r i t y o f t h e i r s o c i e t i e s . 
The autonomy of smal l s t a t e s might be threatened not on ly by the 
super-powers but a l so by emerging middle powers, and indeed by l a r g e 
o r gan i z a t i ons wi th l e g a l or i l l e g a l mot i ves , and even by d i s o r d e r l y 
bands o f mercenar ies . 
Whi le i t i s d i f f i c u l t enough to p r o t e c t i t s land space the capac i t y 
to n e g o t i a t e and e f f e c t i v e l y e x p l o i t the f u l l p o t e n t i a l o f i t s marine 
space i s beyond a l l but a v e r y few Caribbean s t a t e s . Moreover the power 
to p r o t e c t i t from the e x p l o i t a t i o n o f o the rs inc lud ing the dumping o f 
t h e i r hazardous wastes i s something which has so f a r e luded them. 
But e ros ion takes p l ace not on ly in j u r i s d i c t i o n over land and 
marine space but a l s o ove r the capac i t y to take meaningful na t i ona l 
d e c i s i ons . Their economies are h i gh l y vu lne rab l e to the p o l i c i e s 
and l e v e l s o f economic a c t i v i t y o f major t rad ing par tners and many 
instruments o f c o n t r o l e x i s t more on paper than in r e a l i t y . Moreover, 
the i n t e r n a l d e c i s i ons o f one or two i n t e r e s t e d companies might put 
most Caribbean coun t r i e s i n t o e x t e n s i v e economic d i f f i c u l t y . While in 
some cases t h i s must be cons idered a l e g i t i m a t e r i s k which small 
count r i es must take to b e n e f i t from i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rade i t w i l l n e v e r the l e s s 
posfe füiidaniéitlfeal problems f o r those t r y i n g to pursue c ons i s t en t economic 
p d i i c l e s . 
CaribBéáii tbUt i t t i ee a r e t h e r e f o r e concerned not only w i th the l i m i t s 
of independence and s o v e r e i g n t y but a l s o i n c r e a s i n g l y wi th the r o l e and 
mechanisms o f the s t a t e . They w i l l need to e v o l v e economical , e f f i c i e n t ^ 
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and accountable mechanisms to ca r ry out those tasks that the s t a t e 
has been entrusted to per form. They w i l l need to deve lop v i a b l e 
developmental models that w i l l f unc t i on in the f a c e o f t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 
c ircumstances and that are capable o f i n v o l v i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r 
p ropor t i on of t h e i r popula t ions i n the mainstream of s o c i a l and economic 
developments. And they w i l l need to do so w i th in a framework that w i l l 
permit c i t i z e n s to become i n c r e a s i n g l y more r espons ib l e f o r those 
dec i s i ons a f f e c t i n g t h e i r d a i l y l i v e s . 
Developments i n the f i e l d o f s c i ence and technology now make the 
Caribbean a c c e s s i b l e to the newest systems o f communication. They 
hold the most enormous p o t e n t i a l f o r the modernizat ion o f t h e i r 
s o c i e t i e s . At the same t ime, the rap id changes in a t t i t u d e and techniques 
which w i l l deve lop as a consequence may mean the des t ruc t i on o f many 
aspects o f a d i s t i n c t i v e and r i c h c u l t u r e . The a l t e r n a t i v e i s to adapt 
the f a m i l i a r c u l t u r a l forms i n such a way as to permit them not on ly to 
surv i ve but to use the r e v o l u t i o n in communications to b e n e f i t peop le 
of the Caribbean, as w e l l as to enr i ch the l i v e s o f peop le e l sewhere . 
The f o r e go ing are a few o f the fundamental problems faced in g r ea t e r 
o r l e s s e r degree by a l l Caribbean c o u n t r i e s . There i s a t present no 
systemat ic d ia logue on these matters i n the r eg i on as a xvhole. With in 
# 
va r i ous forums one or more o f these i ssues might be r a i s ed but the 
i n env i ab l e march o f events w i l l f o r ce the l eade rs of these small s t a t e s 
to r eac t In haste and con fus ion to changes they did not f o r e s e e . I t 
should not be w i l d l y u n r e a l i s t i c 
to expect that a f t e r concentrated and 
t:ci-fcfrdiñ£ltéd e f f o r t by themselves , workable s o lu t i ons to some o f these 
qüesÉibns M g h t be f o r thcoming . 
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The original task of CDCC, to foster co-operation and co-ordination 
between the diverse countries of the region, remains valid. These 
modalities remain the most likely to arrive at rational solutions to 
common problems as well as the most efficient in maximizing those 
benefits to be derived from increasingly scarce resources. Co-operation 
and co-ordination and the development of regional approaches remain the 
most effective means for circumventing the limits to the absorbtive 
capacities of small states. Development plans and policies that contain 
some minimal elements of co-operation and co-ordination are necessary 
to maximize the benefits to be derived from the regional market and to 
benefit ̂ ^in those resource complementarities which exist in the Region 
and might make it feasible to penetrate world markets. As resources 
become more scarce Caribbean countries can ill afford the duplicative and 
un-co-ordinated, and sometimes conflicting, initiatives of many isolated 
actors. 
In a situation of rapid technological change with the attendant 
need at the national level for structural transformation, governments 
with a crisis mentality cannot permit themselves to be seduced into 
believing that the solution lies in 'more of the same'. The danger of 
focusing solely on the short term is one to which governments of the 
region are particularly prone since most of them must face well informed 
and highly articulate electorates after relatively short periodsof time. 
Activities which do not hold out the promise of short-term benefit have 
therefore tended to be relegated to a lower level of priority. But the 
tlHderiyitig problems remain. 
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The CDCC prov ides a unique vantage point from which to monitor 
developments in the reg ion as a whole, and the r e f o r e to pe rce i v e 
longer term trends and i ssues . This de r i v e s from i t s wide geographic 
spread, the m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y nature of i t s work programme and a growing 
research c a p a b i l i t y f a c i l i t a t e d by the Caribbean Documentation Centre 
and the S t a t i s t i c a l Data Bank which are i n t e g r a l parts of i t s s e c r e t a r i a t . 
While the member governments might not t h e r e f o r e be ab le to make the 
resources a v a i l a b l e to f u l l y exp lo re long term issues i t i s a s e r v i c e 
which the s e c r e t a r i a t , l i n k e d as i t i s with the wider network of UN human 
resources , might be entrusted to per form. 
The. CDCC and i t s s e c r e t a r i a t in Po r t - o f -Spa in must not be judged 
by i t s capac i ty to t r ans f e r resources f o r short- term development. I t s 
funct ion i s e s s e n t i a l l y to prov ide the v e h i c l e f o r conveying Caribbean 
r e g i ona l p o l i c y in to the UN system to ensure that the output of that 
system i s r a t i o n a l , e f f i c i e n t and co-ord inated . This i s a major aspect 
o f the terras of r e f e r ence of the Regional Economic Commissions as mandated 
by General Assembly Reso lut ion 32/197 which intends that they become 
" the main general economic and s o c i a l development centres w i th in the 
United Nations f o r the i r r e s p e c t i v e r e g i o n s " . 
But Caribbean r e g i ona l p o l i c y i s s t i l l a t an e a r l y stage of 
a r t i c u l a t i o n . Economic and Soc ia l p o l i c y i s not y e t f u l l y co-ord inated 
at the nat ional l e v e l , and t h e r e f o r e the message conveyed through f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y tends to be ambigious, and sometimes lack ing in coherence. Moreover, 
the pe r t ep t i oh of the r eg i on as de f ined wi th in the CDCC i s not yet c l e a r 
to a l l i t s mélttberg. While some recognise the r eg ion in i t s t o t a l i t y as 
a v a l i d focus f o r c e r t a in types of r eg i ona l I n i t i a t i v e o thers only 
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r e c o g n i s e a p a r t o f i t and even then o n l y f o r c l o s e l y c i r cumscr ibed 
types o f a c t i o n f o r some s p e c i f i c a c t s . Th is incomp le t e p e r c e p t i o n 
i s due i n pa r t t o the f a c t tha t f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s a r e l a t i v e l y r e c en t 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r most CDCC members and the f i r s t f o cus has tended 
to be p laced on the major economic a c t o r s , sources of t r ade and f i n a n c e . 
The problem i s t h e r e f o r e i n the na ture o f a c y c l e , underdevelopment 
r e s u l t s i n a l a ck o f adequa t e l y c o - o r d i n a t e d domest ic p o l i c i e s which 
i s r e f l e c t e d e x t e r n a l l y as n a t i o n a l a c t o r s speak w i th s epa ra t e v o i c e s . 
Th is i n turn l e a d s to ambiguous, d u p l i c a t i v e and i n e f f i c i e n t inputs 
from abroad i n t o the domes t i c deve lopmenta l p r o c e s s , which a r e t h e r e f o r e 
as a consequence rendered l e s s e f f e c t i v e . 
• -^.ji-.r 
I t w i l l t h e r e f o r e take some t ime b e f o r e the f u l l b e n e f i t to be 
d e r i v e d from c o - o p e r a t i o n and c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n the framework o f 
the CDCC a r e f u l l y unders tood and accep ted and s t i l l l o n g e r b e f o r e t h i s 
p e r c e p t i o n can be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a work ing r e a l i t y . In the i n t e r i m , 
t h e r e f o r e , i t i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the CDCC S e c r e t a r i a t i t s e l f to 
f u l l y understand and d e v e l o p these concepts and the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
which f l o w from them, and w i th the support o f those o ther committed 
governmental and i n s t i t u t i o n a l o p e r a t i v e s sus ta in the i d e a l u n t i l such 
t ime as a s u f f i c i e n t l e v e l o f p o l i t i c a l w i l l can be mustered a t the 
l e v e l o f the governments to make these g o a l s a r e a l i t y . 
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